Cover Story |
AFTER KARGIL KASHMIR The surreptitious bid on India’s part to divide the people of multi-religious, multi-cultural J and K into Muslim K ashmir, Hindu Jammu and Buddhist Ladakh fits well into Pakistan’s communal agenda. And the RSS view of the latest conflict in Kargil as an integral part of the 1,000–year–old face–off between ‘Muslim barbarians’ and peace–loving Hindus’ echoes the call for ‘jehad’ from across the border Kargil has quite naturally dominated the Indian media’s attention ever since intruders from Pakistan were discovered on its glaciated peaks. Every aspect of the situation has been analysed form every possible angle by experts from every discipline. But I have yet not come across any mention of the impact of the event on the minds of the Muslims in Ladakh, in Kashmir and Jammu, on Buddhist–Muslim relations in Kargil, and Muslim–Hindu relations in the other two regions which have important implications for the future of the state. While writing in the present context, many experts
have re–examined the lessons of earlier experiences of Indo–Pak wars, from
diplomatic, strategic and other angles, viz., terms of cease fire agreements,
territories
The present tilt of international opinion against Pakistan is being variously explained as the achievement of able diplomacy of the BJP government, realisation on the part of America of the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, which has become powerful in Pakistan, or the importance that India has acquired as a market and an investment avenue. These explanations may be true to some extent. But the fact that is being completely ignored is that international opinion is also influenced by the merit of a case. The package is important but not more than the material it covers. Every nation watches its national interest but that concern must also include its influence and image among the rest of the nations. That India did not get much international support against Pakistan during the decade–long insurgency in Kashmir was due to the fact that, inter alia, people of the Valley, rightly or wrongly, supported it. Kashmiri youth used to cross the LoC and get arms and training and return as militants for the cause of ‘Azadi’. The ruthless manner in which the insurgency was sought to be suppressed in the initial phase invited universal ondemnation. In contrast, today it is essentially an operation
of the Pakistan army with the support of specially recruited and specially
indoctrinated Mujahids in an area where there is no freedom movement. Of
course, India’s
But why did Pakistan change its position as a
champion of the rights of Kashmiris to that of an aggressor? The BJP blames
the Congress Party for defeating its government, which tempted Pakistan
to exploit the
If the way the situation was developing or drifting
within the state in the recent period was watched carefully, any
observer could not have missed the writing on its political wall regarding
what has happened
Let me recount some of the evidence that gave
an indication of the shape of things to come. Pakistan was under a compulsion
to convert the Kashmiri movement for Azadi into a Muslim movement for Pakistan.
Meanwhile the J and K chief minister, Farooq Abdullah,
shifted his allegiance from the Left–supported United Front to the BJP
and issued a certificate of patriotism to the RSS. The effective political
choice for
Their task was facilitated by the communal polarisation
of Jammu between the National Conference and BJP, and of Ladakh between
the former and the Ladakh Buddhist Association. The voting in the
By this time, fresh initiatives came from America–based think tanks for the solution of the Kashmir problem on the basis of traditional official American thinking that the problem must be resolved “accordingly to the wishes of the people, Hindus, Muslims and Buddhists”. This simplistic thinking completely ignores the ethnic identities and their aspirations. Reflecting the same thinking, the US–based and
influential Kashmir Study Group recommended that “the state be reconstituted
through an internationally supervised ascertainment of the wishes of the
people on
Pakistan came nearer to this position when its foreign minister proposed a district–wise plebiscite to determine the future of the state; thus limiting its claim to, besides the Kashmir Valley, to the Muslim majority districts of Rajouri, Poonch and Doda in Jammu region and the district of Kargil in Ladakh. After extending militant activity to the former area, Kargil appeared to be its natural target. It may merely have been more encouraged by internal developments and external proposals on the subject. The Pakistan government had not properly taken into account the lack of response of the Muslims of Kargil, the formidable military challenge of the Indian armed forces and hostile international reaction to its action. But India’s decisive victory would depend on how far it can meet the political fall–out of Kargil. Can it help Kargil to feel a secure and proud part of a secular Ladakhi identity, which requires restoration of traditional friendly and cordial relations between Buddhists and Muslims? Can a part of the solidarity and sympathy that the whole nation is expressing for valiant soldiers and their families be extended to the patriotic people of Kargil and about 30,000 homeless, famished refugees? Again, how would India meet the international pressure, which would turn on it after Kargil crisis is over, to solve the Kashmir problem with some semblance of popular satisfaction? Can India satisfy the urge for identity, democracy and good administration of the people of Kashmir and help them to have friendly relations with peoples of the other two regions of the state? There are some lessons of Kargil for the nation as a whole, too. While it has generated sentiments of patriotism, sacrifice and fellow feeling, a few reactions exceed legitimate limits of patriotism and, in fact, undermine its moral and psychological basis. The government ban on PTV is, for instance, a reflection on the patriotism of an average citizen which is supposed to be so fragile that it cannot stand a hostile propaganda. If Pakistan can continue its confrontation with India in Kargil, and if India has fought earlier four wars without a ban on the foreign media, why should the present government presume that Indians have become less mature now. What makes the ban silly is the fact that it is
totally unimple-mentable in Kashmir and on the entire Indo–Pak border.
Moreover, PTV’s non–news programmes, particularly its plays, are very popular
in many parts of India. Why should even the entertainment offered by PTV
be banned? Another display of misplaced patriotism is the plea by veteran
cricketer Kapil Dev to snap all sports relations with Pakistan. It is true
that Indo–Pak matches often arouse jingoist sentiments in both countries
There are some voices demanding of some eminent
Muslims that they prove their patriotism, or advocating a ‘final solution’
to the centuries–old aggression upon India from Mohammad Bin Kasim to Mian
Nawaz
Balraj Puri (The writer is president, Jammu Autonomy Forum and chairman, Committee on Regional Autonomy set up by the Jand K government). |