Because of its Brahminical bigotry, Hindu religion has preached and practised communalism since the construction of caste system in India. Many intellectuals who wrote on communalism in India failed to understand that the real roots of communalism lie in the caste system that Brahminical Hinduism constructed from the days of Vedic ritualism. Brahminical communalism destroyed the ethical and moral strength of the sudra–chandals for the last two millennia. At least now, in the first century of the third millennium, the caste communalism itself needs to be destroyed.

Ever since the UF government came to power in 1989 and the Babri Masjid was demolished in 1992, an intense debate on communalism and secularism has been taking place. While this discourse is important to restructure the socio–political forces in India, it must be taken to its logical end. Communalism, as understood from both the etymological and philosophical standpoints, means that a community, by becoming self–centred, attacks other communities, leading to deaths and communal carnage. Such a community is said to be communal.

In non–Indian (Euro–American) societies such community formation was only religious. Thus, communal formations were defined in terms of religion. But in India, we have had castes as closed communities operating within themselves. The relationship between the Brahminical communities and the OBC, SC and ST communities operates on absolute communal lines.

Brahmins, being a non–productive community operating from above, were always hegemonic and aggressive. Any caste that violated the Brahminical code has been attacked throughout history. Such attacks in the past were more brutal than what we see in the contemporary period.

Physical attacks against other communities (castes) took place on a day–to–day basis. More than religious supremacy which gets invoked in attacks on the ‘other’, in India it is Brahminical supremacy which gets invoked in attacking others on a daily and an hourly basis. In the past, all other caste–communities were forcibly made subservient to Brahminism. Brahmins established a perpetual slave–master relationship with Dalit bahujans for centuries, and that it what it expects from Muslims today.

Secularism is the opposite of this. It is supposed to allow freedom to all communities to operate in various fields of human endeavour as equals, it presumes that the fact of an individual belonging to any community or religion in itself does not become a blemish.

In the European context, for example, one could be a Christian, Jew or Muslim without one’s freedom to free socio–economic and spiritual expression being curtailed. But Brahminism in India never believed in the free socio–economic and cultural movements of other caste-communities, even before Islam or Christianity arrived in India. Thus, Brahminism is the most communal formation than any other social structure in the world.

How then can one become a secular individual without opposing Brahminism in the Indian context? But the entire discourse on secularism and communalism in India (written or spoken) did not, and does not, take a stand on Brahminism. No secularist school has constructed a systematic theory of Brahminism or examined its implications for a secular notion of life. Can there be a secular consciousness without homogenising labour?

The Dalit school, therefore, opposes the ‘secularism–communalism debate’ on the ground that this is a theoretical construction of some liberal Brahmins and also elite Muslims. Several Brahmins were close allies of upper caste (ruling) Muslims in the past. But the present Hindu-Muslim tension creates a tension in their relationship. So far as the Dalit bahujans and poor Muslims were/are concerned, their relationship in the working field, food habits (beef, meat, biryani, drinking of toddy and liquor) were more or less the same.

Hindu nationalists and even Brahminical communists had hardly anything to share with Muslims. Muslim eating and drinking habits were in no way close to the lifestyles of even the communist leaders. For Gandhiji goat’s milk was divine whereas goat’s meat was devilish. For Dalit–bahujans, Muslims, Christians and others both meat and milk are divine foods.

Dalit nationalism sees a parallel in Dalit–bahujan, Muslim and Christian cultures. These cultures are mainly based on food, cooking and dress patterns. The cooking of meat by Dalit-bahujans, Muslims and Christians is in many respects common. The Indian variety of Muslim meat foods, like biryani and pulav are part of Dalit–bahujan food items. The Muslim dargah–based worship emerged from Dalit–bahujan practices. Therefore dargahs are as much Dalit-bahujan places as those of ‘lower’ caste Muslims. But that is not true of Brahmin–Baniya food and ritual cultures.

In Andhra Pradesh, for example, the peerla (Moharram) festival is as much a Dalit–bahujan festival as it is that of Muslims. Dalit–bahujans also cut sheep or chicken, specifically go for halal meat on that day, prepare biryani, mutton masala curries and pulav rice, and invite Muslims. In turn, Muslims invite them for a meal at their places.

Such identical practices are unthinkable between Muslims and Brahmin–Baniya families. We, therefore, cannot talk of Hindu–Muslim unity which, in essence, means Brahmin–Muslim unity, without decons-tructing Brahminism and also Dalitising them in terms of day–to–day life practices and cultural existence.

The discourse on secularism–communalism also talks about democratisation of human relations. But how does that take place? Is not deconstruction of Brahminism an essential pre–condition for that historical goal to be achieved? Secondly, democratisation should have a way to adopt, and that way must be pragmatic. Thirdly, democratisation of human relations certainly must establish a thorough respect for labour, the production process and the life styles that go with it.

It is important to construct an enemy image of Brahminism (not Brahmins) and constantly address it so that the forces hanging on to Brahminical values and ideology think of changing. Without doing that, democratisation of relations is not possible in India.

In the recent past, attempts have been made by several writers of the secularist school to construct a ‘secular Hinduism’ which according to them is different from ‘communal Hinduism’. All the left and secular political parties subscribe to this notion. This notion has become so deep–rooted that an increasing number of socio–political organisations were/are adopting it in order to have a positive image for themselves.

Several women’s organisations, civil liberties groups headed by upper caste women and men, have also adopted more or less the same line of argument. The consciousness of organisations and individuals active on the anti–communal front in various parts of the country operates with the notion that Hinduism can be divided into two camps: ‘secular Hinduism’ and ‘communal Hinduism’ (as is possible in case of Christianity and Islam).

This line of argument has been handed down by the Brahminical communist parties from the days of united CPI. Most of the notions on communalism were shaped during the 1947 communal riots. In all anti-communal campaigns, one of the pan–Indian slogans was/is ‘Hindu-Muslim, bhai bhai’ (of course not ‘bahen bahen’).

Historians who have spent a lifetime studying Indian communalism have established that for several centuries Hindus (i.e., Brahmins-Baniyas) and Muslims lived as ‘bhai bhai’ but now the "communal" (not Brahminical) elements are breaking up that relationship. If two social groups which have different socio-cultural practices cannot live as ‘bhai bhai’ that, according to this argument, is communalism.

By the same definition, did/do Brahmins and Madiga–Malas at any point of time live as ‘bhai bhai’? Were there no occasions when Mala-Madigas attempted to live like ‘bhai bhai’ with Brahmins and yet were they not attacked mercilessly by the Brahminical forces? Even today, what kind of relationship exists between Dalit–bahujans and Brahminical ‘fewjans’? (Few + jans = minority)?

Even in offices and institutions employing people from different castes, what kind of relationships exists among these people? Brahminical forces treat Dalit–bahujans at every working place with contempt. In several urban centres, houses are not rented out to SCs and OBCs. Signboards in front of houses ‘To Let’ read: ‘Only for vegetarians’. But in Andhra Pradesh, for example, an inquiry into this shows that though they are not vegetarians, Reddys, Velamas and Kammas manage to get the house on rent. But not Madigas, Malas, Chakalis and Mangalis.

This is true of all urban centres in India. There are occasions where Muslims get houses on rent but not those belonging to the SCs, STs and OBCs. There has been no ‘bhai–bhai’ or ‘bahen–bahen’ relationship between human beings for centuries because of the caste system. Even now the situation is the same.

The point, therefore, is that the Brahmin–Baniya formation itself is communal. Because of its communal character, everything that Brahmin-ical forces believe in, eat or do, is projected as superior or pure. The purity–pollution theory begins by defining Brahmins as the purest. As one goes down the caste ladder, the pollution level increases. Thus, Brahmins are considered as the ‘purest’ while Chamars (Madigas, etc.) are treated as the " most polluted".

The notion of a particular community as the ‘purest’ is highly communal. Such a social construction is more harmful to human society than a religious construction — while religious communalism divides people into ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’, for Brahminism the distinction lies between ‘pure’ and ‘impure’. The notion of superior–inferior leaves scope for dialogue between them, but the notion of pure and pollution does not leave any room for dialogue.

This does not mean that Brahmins, as a people, cannot be changed or secularised. But the first step towards secularising such a communal group should be to propagate slogans like, ‘Brahmin–Madiga bhai–bhai’, ‘Brahmin–Mala bahen–bahen’. This should be propagated on a much bigger scale than the talk about ‘Hindu-Muslim bhai–bhai’ or bahen–bahen. Men and women born in Brahmin families should take part in such deconstruction campaigns of Brahminism that should be led by Dalit–bahujans.

Dalit–bahujan, Muslim, Christian and Buddhist unity plays a key role in deconstructing Brahminism. This unity is slowly evolving after the destruction of the Babri Masjid. Shabbir Ansari, a leader of OBCs among Muslims in Maharashtra, claims that before December 1992, the Muslim elite did not raise the question of Brahminism because the upper caste among Muslims had some kind of an alliance with Brahminical elite — in the political and economic if not cultural spheres.

It was, in fact, a class alliance. But in the context of increasing Brahminical caste–communalism, the ‘Muslim enemy’ image became increasingly dangerous even for the rich and upper caste Muslims. The 1990 Mandal movement was a landmark for Dalit–bahujan and Muslim unity. Christians, of course, have always remained a close ally of Dalit-bahujans as Christianity was always seen as a religion of SCs in India. In order to create a society free of communal riots between communities, we must destroy Brahminism in India. That is the task before SCs, STs, OBCs, women and minorities in the third millennium.

The third millennium will remain a challenge to all those communities striving for social justice. Let us hope that the castes and communities that suffered for the last three millenniums would become free from the chains used by the oppressors to shackle the bodies and minds of the suppressed.