The uprising
Democratic Turkey is the template for
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
BY TARIQ RAMADAN
Even as the mass demonstrations began in Tunisia, who would have
thought that Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s regime would have collapsed
so quickly? Who could have predicted that Egypt would soon witness
such unprecedented popular protest? A barrier has fallen. Nothing will
be the same again. It is quite likely that other countries will follow
the lead of Egypt, given its central and symbolic significance. But
what will be the role of the Islamists after the collapse of the
dictatorships? The Islamist presence has for decades justified the
West’s acceptance of the worst dictatorships in the Arab world. And it
was these very regimes that demonised their Islamist opponents,
particularly Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood which historically represents
that country’s first well-organised mass movement with the political
influence to match. For more than 60 years the Brotherhood has been
illegal but tolerated. It has demonstrated a powerful capacity to
mobilise the people in each relatively democratic election – to trade
unions, professional associations, municipalities, Parliament and so
on – where it has been a participant. So are the Muslim Brothers the
rising power in Egypt and if so, what can we anticipate from such an
organisation? In the West, we have come to expect superficial
analyses of political Islam in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in
particular. However, not only is Islamism a mosaic of widely differing
trends and factions but its many different facets have emerged over
time and in response to historical shifts.
The Muslim Brothers
began in the 1930s as a legalist, anti-colonialist and non-violent
movement that claimed legitimacy for armed resistance in Palestine
against Zionist expansionism during the period before World War II.
The writings from between 1930 and 1945 of Hassan al-Banna, founder of
the Brotherhood, show that he opposed colonialism and strongly
criticised the fascist governments in Germany and Italy. He rejected
the use of violence in Egypt even though he considered it legitimate
in Palestine, in resistance to the Zionist Stern and Irgun terror
gangs. He believed that the British parliamentary model represented
the kind closest to Islamic principles. Al-Banna’s objective was to
found an “Islamic state” based on gradual reform, beginning with
popular education and broad-based social programmes. He was
assassinated in 1949 by the Egyptian government under orders of the
British occupiers.
Following Gamal Abdel Nasser’s revolution in
1952, the movement was subjected to violent repression. Several
distinct trends emerged. Radicalised by their experience of prison and
torture, some of its members (who eventually left the organisation)
concluded that the state had to be overthrown at all costs, even with
violence. Others remained committed to the group’s original position
of gradual reform. Many of its members were forced into exile: some in
Saudi Arabia where they were influenced by the Saudi literalist
ideology, others in countries such as Turkey and Indonesia,
Muslim-majority societies where a wide variety of communities coexist.
Still others settled in the West where they came into direct contact
with the European tradition of democratic freedom.
Today’s
Muslim Brotherhood draws these diverse visions together. But the
leadership of the movement – those who belong to the founding
generation are now very old – no longer fully represents the
aspirations of the younger members who are much more open to the
world, anxious to bring about internal reform and fascinated by the
Turkish example. Behind the unified, hierarchical façade contradictory
influences are at work. No one can tell which way the movement will
go.
The Muslim Brotherhood is not leading the upsurge that is
bringing down Hosni Mubarak: it is made up of young people, of women
and men who have rejected dictatorship. The Muslim Brotherhood, and
the Islamists in general, do not represent the majority. There can be
no doubt that they hope to participate in the democratic transition
when Mubarak departs but no one can tell which faction will emerge in
a dominant position. That makes it impossible to determine the
movement’s priorities. Between the literalists and the partisans of
the Turkish way, anything can happen; the Brotherhood’s political
thinking has evolved considerably over the past 20 years.
Neither the United States nor Europe, not to mention Israel, will
easily allow the Egyptian people to make their dream of democracy and
freedom come true. The strategic and geopolitical considerations are
such that the reform movement will be, and is already, closely
monitored by US agencies in coordination with the Egyptian army which
has played for time and assumed the crucial role of mediator.
By deciding to line up behind Mohamed ElBaradei, who has emerged as
the chief figure among the anti-Mubarak protesters, the Muslim
Brotherhood’s leadership has signalled that now is not the time to
expose itself by making political demands that might frighten the
West, not to mention the Egyptian people. Caution is the watchword.
Respect for democratic principles demands that all forces which
reject violence, which respect the rule of law (both before and after
elections), participate fully in the political process. The Muslim
Brotherhood must be a full partner in the process of change – and will
be, if a minimally democratic state can be established in Egypt
(though no one can define the intentions of foreign powers).
Neither repression nor torture has been able to eliminate the
Brotherhood. The opposite is true. It is only democratic debate and
the vigorous exchange of ideas that have had an impact on the
development of the most problematic Islamist theses – from
understanding of the Shariah to respect for freedom and defence of
equality. Only by exchanging ideas, and not by torture and
dictatorship, can we find solutions that respect the people’s will.
Turkey’s example should be an inspiration to us observers.
The
West continues to use “the Islamist threat” to justify its passivity
and outright support for dictatorships. As resistance to Mubarak
mounted, the Israeli government repeatedly called on Washington to
back his junta against the popular will. Europe adopted a wait-and-see
stance. Both attitudes are revealing: at the end of the day, lip
service to democratic principle carries little weight against the
defence of political and economic interests. The US prefers
dictatorships that guarantee access to oil and allow the Israelis to
continue their slow colonisation, to credible representatives of the
people who could not allow these things to continue.
Citing the
voices of dangerous Islamists to justify not listening to the voices
of the people is short-termist as well as illogical. Under both the
Bush and Obama administrations, the US has suffered heavy losses of
credibility in the Middle East; the same is true for Europe. If the
Americans and Europeans do not re-examine their policies, other powers
in Asia and South America may begin to interfere soon with their
elaborate structure of strategic alliances. As for Israel, which has
now positioned itself as friend and protector of the Arab
dictatorships, its government may well come to realise that those
dictatorships are committed only to its policy of blind colonisation.
The regional impact of Mubarak stepping down will be huge yet the
exact consequences are unpredictable. After both the Tunisian and
Egyptian revolutions, the political message is clear: with non-violent
mass protest anything is possible and no autocratic government is safe
and secure any longer.
Presidents and kings are feeling the
pressure of this historical turning point. The unrest has reached
Algeria, Yemen and Mauritania. One should also look at Jordan, Syria
and even Saudi Arabia: preventive reforms have been announced, as if
there were a common feeling of fear and vulnerability. The rulers of
all these countries know that if the Egyptian is collapsing, they run
the risk of the same destiny. This state of instability is worrying
and at the same time very promising. The Arab world is awakening with
dignity and hope. The changes spell hope for true democrats and
trouble for those who would sacrifice democratic principle to their
economic and geostrategic calculations. The liberation of Egypt seems
to be just the start. Who will be next? If Jordan and Yemen follow, so
will Saudi Arabia – the heart of the Muslim world – and Riyadh would
be in a critical position with no choice but to evolve towards a more
open political system.
Around the world, among Muslims, there
is a critical mass that would support this move, the necessary
revolution at the centre. In the end, only democracies that embrace
all non-violent political forces can bring about peace in the Middle
East, a peace that must also respect the dignity of the Palestinians.
(Tariq Ramadan is professor of contemporary Islamic studies at
Oxford. His latest book is The Quest for Meaning: Developing a
Philosophy of Pluralism, Allen Lane. Ramadan is the grandson of Hassan
al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928. This
article was published in The Huffington Post on February 8, 2011.)
Courtesy: The Huffington Post; www.huffingtonpost.com
|
|