BY HASSINA SHERJAN
Kabul: For several years President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan
has been trying to negotiate and reconcile with supposedly moderate elements of
the Taliban to end the insurgency. This approach has failed every time. Thus it
is puzzling to many Afghans that President Obama has also been talking about
negotiating with "moderates". Let’s hope that when the two men met in Washington
this week (May 6), along with President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan, the idea
of reaching out to the Islamic extremists was shelved once and for all.
After all, President Karzai’s efforts have simply revealed the
weakness of the Afghan government and its international allies. Taliban
spokesmen have repeatedly demanded unacceptable conditions for talks, including
the departure of all foreign forces from Afghanistan and the establishment of
Shariah law.
Indeed, shortly after Mr Obama raised the subject of
reconciliation, the Taliban rejected his proposal, stating that there were no
extremists or moderate groups within their ranks. On this point at least, the
Taliban are right. Zabiullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesman, put it very clearly:
"The Taliban were united under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar. All the
fighters follow and obey orders of one central command. The existence of
moderates and extremist elements within the rank and file of Taliban is wishful
thinking of the West and the Afghan government."
What can be the purpose of talks with the Taliban? These men
deprive women of their rights, throw acid in the faces of schoolgirls, reject
religious freedom and oppose constitutional democracy. They also threaten to
kill any Afghans who have worked with western militaries and non-governmental
groups or had other contact with foreigners.
Is it possible, as some have said, that the Taliban have
mellowed since being toppled in 2001? Mohammed Ibrahim Hanafi, a top Taliban
commander, answered that question in an interview in March with CNN: "Our law is
still the same old law which was in place during our rule in Afghanistan."
The more President Karzai and his western allies talk about
reconciliation, the further their public support will plummet. I returned to
Afghanistan in 2001 after more than two decades in America and founded a
manufacturing company with the intention of using part of its profits to help
young women get an education. In the early days the discussions at our
organisation’s meetings were dominated by talk of building schools and other big
plans. Lately however the main topic has been the future of us women in
Afghanistan under another Taliban regime. We know that there is not, and will
never be, any "moderate Taliban". Extremists and ideologues do not compromise.
The atmosphere has been made worse by the president’s signing of
a family law affecting Shiite Muslims that places restrictions on when a woman
can leave her house and states the circumstances in which she is obliged to have
sex with her husband. I was part of a group of civil society representatives who
recently met with President Karzai to express our concerns about the law; he
replied that he hadn’t known the full details when he signed it and promised to
"fight for us" to have it amended. We’ll see. But his later statement that
"there are no reconciliation processes" going on with the Taliban, which seems
at odds with the facts, did not inspire much hope.
The family law and other governmental efforts to appease
religious extremists are having one effect that reminds me of the aftermath of
the Soviet invasion of 1979: Afghanistan is being drained of the people who
would be most effective at putting it back together. It seems as if every group
of Afghans that attends training programmes in the West now returns just a bit
smaller. Last year the accountant and the top administrator of my factory left
for the Netherlands with their families. My new accountant recently went to
Islamabad, Pakistan, to meet with German embassy officials about a possible
visa.
This is a far cry from the 1960s and ’70s when many Afghans,
including my father and five of my uncles, studied abroad on scholarships but
returned to work in the government or to start businesses and create jobs. That
sense of nationalism has disappeared; unless we rediscover it, Afghanistan will
become a failed state.
The only "reconciliation" strategy that is going to work is one
between the Kabul government and the Afghan people. The key is making changes at
the community level. Many local mullahs and citizens who have tolerated the
Taliban in the past are open to working with a government that can protect them
and help them find livelihoods. The government and its allies can best weaken
the insurgency by better protecting the population, organising local citizens’
groups to cooperate on economic development and hiring more people from every
part of the country into the growing Afghan army and police force.
This is the only way that the reconcilables will be separated
from the irreconcilables. We need to understand where Afghanistan’s true
moderates are to be found and not look for them in leadership positions of one
of the most repressive organisations on earth.
(Hassina Sherjan is the president of Boumi, a manufacturer of
decorative products for the home, and the director of Aid Afghanistan for
Education, a non-profit group. This article was published in The New York
Times on May 7, 2009.)
Courtesy: The New York Times; www.nytimes.com