Eleven years ago a million Pakistanis danced in the streets
after six nuclear weapons had been successfully tested. They had been told that
making nuclear bombs was the biggest thing a country could do; Pakistan was now
a great country. But this week’s North Korean nuclear test (May 25) gave
rock-solid proof that it was a lie.
North Korea is a country that no one admires. It is unknown for
scientific achievement, has little electricity or fuel, food and medicine are
scarce, corruption is ubiquitous and its people live in terribly humiliating
conditions under a vicious, dynastic dictatorship. In a famine some years ago,
North Korea lost nearly 8,00,000 people. And it has an enormous prison
population of 2,00,000 that is subjected to systematic torture and abuse.
Why does a miserable, starving country continue to spend its
last penny on the bomb? On developing and testing a fleet of missiles whose
range increases from time to time? The answer is clear: North Korea’s nuclear
weapons and missiles are instruments of blackmail rather than means of defence.
Brandished threateningly, and manipulated from time to time, these bombs are
designed to keep the flow of international aid going.
Surely the people of North Korea gained nothing from their
country’s nuclearisation. But they cannot challenge their oppressors. But we
Pakistanis – who are far freer – must ask: what have we gained from the bomb?
Some had imagined that nuclear weapons would make Pakistan an
object of awe and respect internationally. They were told that Pakistan would
acquire the mantle of leadership of the Islamic world. Indeed, in the aftermath
of the 1998 tests, Pakistan’s stock had shot up in some Muslim countries before
it crashed. But today, with a large swathe of its territory lost to insurgents,
one has to defend Pakistan against allegations of being a failed state. In terms
of governance, economy, education or any reasonable quality of life indicators,
Pakistan is not a successful state that is envied by anyone.
Contrary to claims made in 1998, the bomb did not transform
Pakistan into a technologically and scientifically advanced country. Again, the
facts are stark. Apart from relatively minor exports of computer software and
light armaments, science and technology remain irrelevant in the process of
production. Pakistan’s current exports are principally textiles, cotton,
leather, footballs, fish and fruit. This is just as it was before Pakistan
embarked on its quest for the bomb.
The value-added component of Pakistani manufacturing somewhat
exceeds that of Bangladesh and Sudan but is far below that of India, Turkey and
Indonesia. Nor is the quality of science taught in our educational institutions
even remotely satisfactory. But then, given that making a bomb these days
requires only narrow technical skills rather than scientific ones, this is
scarcely surprising.
What became of the claim that the pride in the bomb would
miraculously weld together the disparate peoples who constitute Pakistan? While
many in Punjab still want the bomb, angry Sindhis want water and jobs – and they
blame
Punjab for taking these away. Pakhtun refugees from Swat and Buner, hapless
victims of a war between the Taliban and the Pakistani army, are tragically
being turned away by ethnic groups from entering Sindh. This rejection strikes
deeply against the concept of a single nation united in adversity.
As for the Baloch, they deeply resent that the two nuclear test
sites – now radioactive and out of bounds – are on their soil. Angry at being
governed from Islamabad, many have taken up arms and demand that Punjab’s army
get off their backs. Many schools in Balochistan refuse to fly the Pakistani
flag, the national anthem is not sung and black flags celebrate Pakistan’s
Independence Day. Balochistan University teems with the icons of Baloch
separatism: posters of Akbar Bugti, Balaach Marri, Brahamdagh Bugti and ‘General
Sheroff’ are everywhere. The bomb was no glue.
Did the bomb help Pakistan liberate Kashmir from Indian rule? It
is a sad fact that India’s grip on Kashmir – against the will of Kashmiris – is
tighter today than it has been for a long time. As the late Eqbal Ahmad often
remarked, Pakistan’s abysmally poor politics helped snatch defeat from the jaws
of victory. Its strategy for confronting India – secret jihad by Islamic
fighters protected by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons – backfired terribly in the
arena of international opinion. More importantly, it created the hydra-headed
militancy now haunting Pakistan. Some mujahideen who felt betrayed by Pakistan’s
army and politicians ultimately took revenge by turning their guns against their
sponsors and trainers. The bomb helped us lose Kashmir.
Some might ask, didn’t the bomb stop India from swallowing up
Pakistan? First, an upward-mobile India has no reason to want an additional 170
million Muslims. Second, even if India wanted to, territorial conquest is
impossible. Conventional weapons, used by Pakistan in a defensive mode, are
sufficient protection. If the mighty American python could not digest Iraq,
there can never be a chance for a middling power like India to occupy Pakistan,
a country four times larger than Iraq.
It is, of course, true that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons deterred
India from launching punitive attacks at least thrice since the 1998 tests.
Pakistan’s secret incursion into Kargil in 1999, the December 13 attack on the
Indian Parliament in 2001 (initially claimed by Jaish-e-Mohammad) and the Mumbai
attack in 2008 by Lashkar-e-Tayyaba did create sentiment in India for ferreting
out Pakistan-based militant groups. So should we keep the bomb to protect
militant groups? Surely it is time to realise that these means of conducting
foreign policy are tantamount to suicide.
It was a lie that the bomb could protect Pakistan, its people or
its armed forces. Rather, it has helped bring us to this grievously troubled
situation and offers no way out. The threat to Pakistan is internal. The bomb
cannot help us recover the territory seized by the Baitullahs and Fazlullahs nor
bring Waziristan back to Pakistan. More nuclear warheads, test-launching more
missiles or buying yet more American F-16s and French submarines will not help.
Pakistan’s security problems cannot be solved by better weapons.
Instead, the way forward lies in building a sustainable and active democracy, an
economy for peace rather than war, a federation in which provincial grievances
can be effectively resolved, elimination of the feudal order and creating a
tolerant society that respects the rule of law.
It is time for Pakistan to become part of the current global
move against nuclear weapons. India – which had thrust nuclearisation upon an
initially unwilling Pakistan – is morally obliged to lead. Both must announce
that they will not produce more fissile material to make yet more bombs. Both
must drop insane plans to expand their nuclear arsenals.
Eleven years ago a few Pakistanis and Indians had argued that
the bomb would bring no security, no peace. They were condemned as traitors and
sell-outs by their fellow citizens. But each passing year shows just how right
we were.