he 19th century
Prussian military analyst, General Carl von Clausewitz, is credited as being one
of the intellectual fathers of military theory. His famous work, Vom Kreige
(‘On War’), despite remaining finally incomplete, has almost a biblical
status for students of warfare. One of Clausewitz’s concepts is that of ‘the fog
of war’ i.e. the ambiguity and confusion that surround most theatres of war,
making it difficult to delineate the truth.
He wrote: "The great uncertainty of all data in war is a
peculiar difficulty because all action must to a certain extent be planned in a
mere twilight, which in addition not infrequently – like the effect of a fog or
moonshine – gives to things exaggerated dimensions and unnatural appearance."
There are numerous such kinds of ‘fogs’. One relates to
insufficient knowledge of the political intentions, capabilities and logistical
strengths of the adversary, which we try to assess through such means as
diplomatic intelligence, secret intelligence, open source intelligence and
strategic modelling. Specifically, military ambiguity relates to the structure,
strength, capability and disposition of our own and the adversary’s offensive
and defensive assets. Own-force ambiguity can be caused by failure to report
material deficiencies or unwillingness to escalate concerns, leading to a
dangerously overoptimistic view of one’s capabilities. Adversary ambiguity may
be a result of inaccurate intelligence, sources being subverted or deceived or
the adversary’s counter-intelligence presenting a false picture. In addition,
unanticipated situations will arise. There is always the unpredictability of the
element of chance.
A home-grown example of erroneous strategic decisions is the
Pakistani establishment’s miscalculation in 1965 that our army’s crossing of the
ceasefire line in Kashmir would not be seen by the Indian army as a ‘redline’ to
unleash an attack across the international border. As a result, where we had set
out to conquer Kashmir, the valour and fighting ability of our officers and men
notwithstanding, we in fact ended up defending Lahore and Sialkot.
There are numerous other ambiguities which are not relevant to
the topic here. What is relevant is one that was implied, if not specifically
mentioned, by von Clausewitz or former US secretary of defence, Robert McNamara,
in the outstanding documentary film, The Fog of War. This arises from the
propaganda that is an integral part of warfare in order to sustain the morale of
one’s own forces or populations. Propaganda includes both slanting things in a
particular light (the United States military bulletins always gave out that they
were winning the war in Vietnam) or telling outright lies (the Chinese army was
only awaiting our signal to attack India in 1971).
Now, we are well aware of the lies we in this country have
repeatedly told ourselves in our brief history as an independent nation. To
begin with, even the very narratives of the nature and course of the
independence movement – and therefore our raison d’être – were contrived well
after the event, with concepts like ‘the ideology of Pakistan’ being promoted by
the Yahya regime’s information minister, General Sher Ali Khan, as late as 1969.
The wholesale rewriting of the history of this region was
undertaken, to achieve completion in the poisonous era of General Zia ul-Haq. As
a result, our origins and identities have become confused and lost in an
ahistorical mélange of half-truths and outright lies.
Look at all the blind spots in even our knowledge of newsworthy
events. Who were the assassins of Liaquat Ali Khan? Benazir Bhutto? Zia ul-Haq?
Why? How did Zulfikar Ali Bhutto actually die? And (since the case against
Bhutto was clearly a false one) who actually murdered Nawab Mohammad Ahmed Khan
and why? One could go on in this refrain forever. We are, it seems, indeed a
fogbound nation.
The Zia regime spun every kind of confusing fog around the
origins and purpose of the so-called jihad in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union, we
were told, had this inexplicable thirst for ‘warm waters’ that was driving them
southwards to conquer first Afghanistan and then Pakistan. And the Afghan jihad
had arisen in spontaneous resistance against this. Looking back at what proved
to be one of the most fateful decision points in Pakistan’s history, it is
doubtful we will ever know the truth.
Still further confusion surrounds the sudden eruption from
Pakistan into Afghanistan in 1993 of Mullah Mohammad Omar’s Taliban warriors.
Inter alia, contrasting narratives explain the beginnings of the Taliban. One is
that the rape and murder by mujahideen bandits of the boys and girls of a family
travelling to Kandahar sparked Mullah Omar and his students to vow to rid
Afghanistan of these criminals. The other is that the Pakistani trucking mafia,
known as the ‘Afghan transit trade’, trained, armed and financed the Taliban to
clear the southern road across Afghanistan to the Central Asian republics of
extortionate bandit gangs. Either way, or in some other way entirely, the
appearance of the Taliban on the historical stage has led to untold consequences
for Afghanistan, for Pakistan and for the world in general.
As this new year is born, our armed forces are locked in what is
clearly to be a long-drawn-out counter-insurrectionary campaign against the
Taliban and their allies in Pakistan. Terrorist bands, drawing sustenance from
the same sources of ideological inspiration (and perhaps funding), have been
repeatedly blowing up and murdering the citizens of Pakistan. They have also
launched spectacular terrorist attacks against other countries, the most recent
of which was the Mumbai carnage.
This Mumbai attack has upended the peace process between
Pakistan and India, throwing years of efforts into the trash can. Worse, the
reactions to the Mumbai atrocity have brought the citizens of this, our country
to the brink of a war that could lead to their nuclear annihilation. Must we
deny reality, almost to the point of virtually protecting these traitorous
insurgents and mass murderers, at the possible cost of a terminal holocaust?
So here, in its most dramatic manifestation, we see that
clinging to the half-truths and falsehoods of one’s own propaganda – the
self-generated fog of war – has already had frightful consequences for all of
us. Worse, it could lead to such immense destruction that it will not matter who
started it or who else we take down with us into the inferno of modern warfare.
