wice
in the past four years, first in 2002 and then again in 2003, violent
clashes in Marad, a coastal town off Kozhikode in north Kerala, not only
took a toll on lives but deepened communal polarisation. On January 3,
2002, communal clashes between Hindu and Muslim extremists started in the
afternoon and by the next morning there were five dead and several injured
(‘Massacre in Marad’, Communalism Combat, May 2003 and
‘People as Pawns’, Communalism Combat, November 2003). Two of those
killed were Hindus while three were Muslims.
On May 2, 2003, a calculated one-sided attack by Muslim
extremists who came armed with lethal weapons left nine dead and scores of
severely injured men and women on Marad beach. Eight of those killed in
cold blood were Hindus.
On the night of the attack, police arrested more than 50
people involved in the crime, some of whom were hiding in the local Juma
Masjid after the carnage. A large number of weapons and explosives were
also found at the mosque soon after the killings.
Fearing reprisals after the Muslim attack, more than 2,000
Muslim women and children fled Marad beach on May 3, 2003. They fled,
leaving all their belongings at home, to take refuge at the three relief
camps set up in the neighbouring areas of Chaliyam, Kappakkal and
Payyankkal.
For six months, the AK Antony government in Kerala faced
the critical problem of rehabilitation of these refugees as some Hindu
organisations, who had taken control of Marad beach following the attack
by Muslim extremists, resisted residents’ attempts to go back to their
homes. The Hindu organisations, led by the VHP and locally spearheaded by
the Araya Samajam, a caste organisation of Hindu fishermen, physically
stopped all efforts at rehabilitation, demanding that the government order
a CBI inquiry into the alleged larger conspiracy behind the attack.
Ultimately, the state government ordered a judicial
inquiry into the communal violence in Marad after the CPI (M)-led
opposition, supported by the Congress party faction led by veteran leader
K. Karunakaran, raised the demand.
Now, more than three years later, the judicial report
charges political parties with precipitating a minor incident into a major
communal issue. Headed by Justice Thomas P. Joseph, the commission’s
report was tabled in the Kerala assembly on September 27 this year but
made public only recently. Communalism Combat has been able to
access the report and is publishing the commission’s findings below.
While stating that there was not enough evidence to
suggest any direct international involvement in the incident of May 2,
2003, the Joseph Commission recommends a multi-agency probe to investigate
the larger conspiracy at work in the planning and execution of the
massacre.
The report is particularly critical of the Indian Union
Muslim League (IUML), a coalition partner of the Congress-led United
Democratic Front government which ruled the state in 2003, holding that
some IUML leaders were aware of the conspiracy behind the attack and that
activists of the National Development Front (NDF), a local Muslim
organisation, as well as some IUML activists were actively involved in its
planning and execution.
However, the IUML is not the only party that the Marad
commission report indicts. The report also accuses local leaders of the
CPI (M), IUML, BJP and RSS of deliberately exploiting a minor altercation
between locals in communally sensitive Marad in 2001 (which was amicably
settled by local elders) to provoke the subsequent communal conflagration
in 2002 that claimed five lives. Local politicians then used the 2002
riots to create a further divide between Hindus and Muslims in the area.
The state government’s procrastination with regard to punishment of those
accused in the 2002 riots only served to widen the communal gap. The
increasing divide between Hindus and Muslims led to the attack on Marad
beach in May 2003.
The report accuses the police of persistent inaction and
failure to take effective steps to prevent the incident. Justice Joseph
flays the then state government for refusing to order a CBI probe into the
incident and points out serious lapses on the part of the Kozhikode civil
and police administration during that period. Four senior officials who
have been criticised by the Thomas P. Joseph Commission include the then
district collector TO Sooraj, Kozhikode police commissioner, Sanjiv Kumar
Patjoshi, assistant commissioner of police, M. Abdul Raheem and inspector
general of police, Mahesh Kumar Singla. The state government has now
initiated action against the four officers.
The following extract is excerpted from the report of the
Thomas P. Joseph Commission of Inquiry appointed by the government to
inquire into the incidents that occurred at Marad beach, Kozhikode on May
2, 2003, which resulted in the death of nine persons, injuries to many
others and damage to property.
FINDINGS
I. The facts and circumstances which led to the incident
at Marad beach, Kozhikode on 2-5-2003 resulting in the death of 9 (nine)
persons, serious injuries to many others and damage to properties.
1) A minor, insignificant incident that occurred at Marad
beach, a communally divided and most sensitive area, during the New Year
celebrations in the evening of 31-12-2001 and which was almost settled by
the elders of the locality, transformed into a major communal riot at
Marad beach on 3/4-1-2002 due to the intervention of the CPI (M), IUML and
BJP/RSS activists for their gains and that resulted in the death of five
persons, injuries to several others and damage to property. It is quite
unlikely those activists indulged in that act without the blessings of
their respective leaderships at least at the local level.
2) The communal division that existed in Marad beach, the
communal riot in that area on 3/4-1-2002 resulting in the death of five
persons, including Aboobacker, an NDF activist, coupled with the divisive
activities of the Muslim fundamentalists and other forces also contributed
to the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003.
3) The unjustified delay in the state government granting
sanction for prosecution of the accused involved in the crime cases
relating to the incidents on 3/4-1-2002, the consequent delay in
prosecuting them and their getting released on bail enabled the
fundamentalist elements to ignite the fire of revenge in the minds of the
close relatives of the Muslims killed on 3/4-1-2002, which also
contributed to the massacre on 2-5-2003.
II. Whether there was involvement of any external/internal
organisation or organisations in the planning and execution of the
incident (on 2-5-2003).
1) The massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003 was not merely
revenge for the killing of the three Muslims at Marad beach on 3/4-1-2002.
Instead, that was a one-sided attack on the Hindus, without any
provocation, by the Muslim fundamentalists/terrorists capitalising on the
revenge the close relatives of Aboobacker, Kunhikoya and Yunus, who were
killed on 3/4-1-2002, had.
2) Apart from the conspiracy reported by the CBCID (Crime
Branch Central Investigation Department), Kozhikode in its final report in
Cr. No. 82/03 of Beypore Police Station (Cr. No. 116/CR/03 of CBCID),
there was a larger conspiracy involving Muslim fundamentalists/terrorists
and other forces in the planning and execution of the massacre at Marad
beach on 2-5-2003.
3) There is no sufficient evidence before the commission
to show that any international agency is directly involved in the massacre
at Marad beach on 2-5-2003.
4) The NDF activists are actively involved in the planning
and execution of the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003. It is quite
unlikely that the NDF activists were thus involved without the blessings
of their leadership at least at the local level.
5) The IUML activists are actively involved in the
planning and execution of the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003. It is
quite unlikely that the IUML activists were thus involved without the
blessings of their leadership at least at the local level.
6) Some members of the Mahal Committee of Marad Juma
Masjid mosque (H. Party No. 1) at Marad beach were involved in that
conspiracy or had prior information of that conspiracy which resulted in
the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003.
7) Sri PP Moideen Koya (H. Party No. 2), local leader of
the IUML, is involved in the conspiracy for the massacre at Marad beach on
2-5-2003 or had prior information about that conspiracy and the impending
violence at Marad beach.
8) There is every reason to think that Sri Mayin Haji s/o
Kunhali, (H. Party No. 3) chairman of Calicut Development Authority and
leader of the IUML, had prior information about the conspiracy, which
resulted in the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003.
9) The CBCID, Kozhikode had not investigated into the
larger conspiracy involving other forces, the source of all explosives,
the large quantity of weapons collected for the massacre and the source of
the large funds used in the planning and execution of the massacre at
Marad beach on 2-5-2003. A multi-agency consisting of the officers of
the Central Intelligence Bureau, the Central Bureau of Investigation and
the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence has to investigate into that
larger conspiracy and fix liability.
III. Whether there was any lapse on the part of the police
or administrative machinery in taking timely, preventive and remedial
action and in dealing with the situation.
1) The Kozhikode district civil administration failed in
taking timely, preventive and remedial action to prevent the massacre at
Marad beach on 2-5-2003.
2) The Kozhikode city police administration failed in
taking all effective steps to prevent the massacre at Marad beach on
2-5-2003.
3) The city police administration led by Sri TK Vinod
Kumar, the then commissioner of police, Kozhikode acted effectively after
the massacre at Marad beach on 2-5-2003 in arresting the culprits who took
asylum in the Marad Juma Masjid mosque, recovering weapons from them and
in preventing the spread of violence. The action taken by the then
commissioner, Sri TK Vinod Kumar in that regard is quite commendable.
4) But it is quite unfortunate and disturbing that the
police were not able to prevent the damaging or removal of household
articles or even damaging the houses at Marad beach following the massacre
on 2-5-2003.
IV. Such other matters as are incidental to and arising
out of the above terms.
1) The lethargic attitude or the policy of appeasement
adopted by some political parties has encouraged and emboldened religious
fundamentalism and terrorism even involving external forces, which is a
reality in this state.
2) The successive government after 1996 (which alone is
taken into consideration here) failed in taking effective steps to prevent
the growth of religious fundamentalism and terrorism in this state. That
also led to communal clashes and riots in this state.
3) The state government unjustifiably refused to order
investigation by the CBI into the unparalleled incident at Marad beach on
2-5-2003 or at least about the larger conspiracy involving other forces,
the source of all explosives, the large quantity of other weapons
collected and the funding in the planning and execution of that incident.
4) The failure/refusal of the CBCID, Kozhikode (which
investigated the massacre on 2-5-2003) to investigate into the larger
conspiracy involving other forces, source of all weapons and the source of
the large funding in the planning and execution of the massacre at Marad
beach on 2-5-2003 is quite suspicious and disturbing. The state government
or other appropriate authority has to enquire into the role played by H.
Party No. 7, Sri Mahesh Kumar Singla, inspector general of police (who
supervised the investigation by the CBCID) in that regard.
5) Sri TO Sooraj, the then district collector (H. Party
No. 4) is also responsible for the failure of the civil administration in
taking all timely, preventive and remedial action to prevent the massacre
at Marad beach on 2-5-2003. The allegation of communalism raised against
Sri TO Sooraj cannot be ignored as baseless and is required to be enquired
into by the state government or such other authority as that could have
had bearing on the failure of the civil administration referred to above.
6) Sri Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi, former commissioner of
police, Kozhikode (H. Party No. 5), is also responsible for the failure of
the city police administration in taking all effective steps to prevent
violence at Marad beach on 2-5-2003. He did not effectively carry out many
of the directions issued to him in that regard by his superior officer. He
did not maintain a good relationship with the then district collector,
Kozhikode who was also the district magistrate.
7) The lack of good rapport between Sri TO Sooraj and Sri
Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi, the administrative heads of the civil
administration and city police administration, Kozhikode and consequent
lack of coordination between the two departments affected the effective
preventive and remedial action by both departments in preventing violence
at Marad beach on 2-5-2003.
8) Sri M. Abdul Raheem, the then asst. commissioner of
police (south subdivision), Kozhikode has not discharged his duties in
preventing violence at Marad beach on 2-5-2003 sincerely and responsibly.
He had not effectively, sincerely and honestly carried out the directions
in that regard, issued by his superiors. His very appointment at Kozhikode
south subdivision is shrouded by suspicious circumstances. The allegation
that he had connections with some of the forces behind the massacre at
Marad beach on 2-5-2003 cannot be ignored as baseless and hence is to be
enquired by the state government.
V. To suggest suitable measures to avoid such unfortunate
incidents in future.
A. Ideological measures
1) The government should, with consensus among the
religious groups and without of course violating the fundamental rights if
any in this regard, ensure that religious instruction is not imparted and
religious symbols are not exhibited in educational institutions and at any
rate ensure that the religious instruction (where it is permissible under
law) is imparted beyond school hours and appropriate changes in that
regard are made in the Kerala Education Act and the Rules.
2) Secularism, moral values, communal amity and religious
tolerance should be taught in educational institutions. Morality and value
clubs should be started in schools. Constitutional provisions, ethical
principles and human rights laws required for communal amity should be
part of the curriculum for TTC, BEd, MEd courses and in the in-service
courses for teachers.
3) The government should, by appropriate measures, ensure
that religious instruction wherever given is transparent and did not in
any way violate or tend to violate public order, health and morality.
4) The government should ensure by consensus among various
religious groups that persons engaged in giving religious instruction are
equipped with modern education so that they could give instruction
regarding public order, morality, religious tolerance and secularism,
which in turn would prevent the growth of religious fanaticism,
fundamentalism and terrorism.
5) Films, serials, etc. promoting religious coexistence
are to be encouraged. Those creating chaos and disharmony are to be
banned. If necessary, appropriate changes in that regard should be made in
the law relating to censorship.
6) Non-governmental organisations should be encouraged to
promote religious and communal harmony. Such organisations should act in
cooperation with the police authorities in this regard.
7) There should be reasonable restrictions, without
affecting fundamental rights if any, in the matter of taking out
processions on the basis of caste/religion etc. along public places/roads.
There must be a code of conduct evolved among the religious/caste leaders
in this regard, bearing in mind that any fundamental right to propagate
religion is subject to public safety and order. Sufficient security
deposits should be taken from the organisers of the religious festivals
and processions along public places/roads. They should execute guarantee
for the peaceful conduct of the processions/festivals on public
roads/places. In case of disturbance by the processionists, the deposit
should be forfeited and action should be taken against the organisers of
the festival/procession.
8) Religious processions should be accompanied by
sufficient police force to prevent disturbances. Organisers should be held
liable to pay the charges for deployment of sufficient policemen.
9) Religious observances by any community in open public
places so as to cause obstruction, annoyance or inconvenience to the
people at large should be discouraged and action should be taken against
those who defied the instruction of the police in that regard.
10) The provisions in the Manual of Guidelines to Prevent
and Control Communal Disturbances and to Promote Communal Harmony
regarding conduct of religious festivals/processions and religious
observances should be modified as above, given statutory force and
enforced strictly.
11) Religions must teach communal amity, religious
tolerance and humanity. Any religion crossing the limits should be
disciplined by the arms of the law.
12) There should be constant dialogues between different
religions/communities, which will enable (them to) clear
misunderstandings.
B. Political measures
1) Religion must be separated from state matters, politics
and education. There should, if necessary, be a special enactment
separating religion from state matters, politics and education.
2) Government and political parties should be strictly
secular, not merely in words but also in deeds. They should desist from
appearing and/or aligning with communal forces. Registration of political
parties promoting or helping in any manner riots, religious ill will, etc.
should be cancelled.
3) Government should conduct a deep study into the
causative, developmental, control, reduction and preventive aspects of
communal clashes, the growth and activities of religious
fundamentalists/terrorists in the state, identify such elements and
organisations and take steps to prevent such activities.
4) Government should implement the recommendations made in
this regard by the judicial inquiry commissions which went into cases of
communal riots.
5) Government should study the inflow of foreign funds and
unaccounted money into the state, its use by fundamentalist/terrorist
groups or non-governmental organisations, and take necessary steps in that
regard.
6) Government should ensure the economic sustainability of
people living in the coastal areas. Steps should be taken to improve and
diversify the people’s means of subsistence. Kudumbasree (development)
projects must be started in the coastal areas. Government should adopt
measures for poverty alleviation and diversification of strategies of
income and its generation in the coastal areas (especially for Marad, a
fishing harbour may be established, apart from immediately enforcing and
carrying out the Marad package).
7) Government should take appropriate and necessary
action, step by step, to reduce the density of population in the coastal
areas by rehabilitation in other areas, which will avoid/reduce problems
due to scarcity of land, economic and natural resources.
8) Since eve teasing and molestation (I found some
intelligence reports about eve teasing at Marad beach before 2-5-2003)
have the potential for starting riots, there should be proper illumination
in the lanes and by-lanes of such riot prone areas.
9) Government should provide facility in coastal areas for
psychiatric counselling and treatment.
10) Attached to every medical college and district
government hospital at least, crisis intervention centres consisting of
psychiatrists and specially trained staff should be opened as a permanent
arrangement. The police should provide psychiatric help when major
incidents, which are likely to create psychiatric problems to the
perpetrators of violence, victims and witnesses to such incidents, occur.
11) Government should set up a coastal security guard in
the coastal areas of the state to prevent smuggling and transportation of
narcotic drugs, unauthorised and unaccounted money, arms, etc. through the
sea.
12) Secular bodies should be formed in coastal areas –
such bodies should have the poor people of the village as its members.
Such bodies can be used for resolution of conflicts in the conventional
form (like the Kadalkodathi formed at Marad).
13) Government should ensure that officials appointed in
key posts in riot prone areas and districts are persons capable of
acquiring the confidence of different communities.
14) Permanent peace committees should be set up at
appropriate levels. Such committees should consist of non-controversial
and respected persons of the locality belonging to all communities,
professionals and social workers. The members of the peace committee shall
not have political affiliations. Such peace committees should endeavour to
bring peace in times of conflicts.
C. Legal measures
1) Special enactment should be made to stringently deal
with communal clashes/riots. Such special enactment should provide for
special rules regarding the burden of proof and acceptability of
statements of accused/witnesses recorded before the judicial magistrates.
2) The provisions of the Religious Institutions
(Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 should be strictly enforced. The
concerned authorities should periodically call for information from the
concerned persons about storage of weapons/use of funds etc. as stated
therein and reports regarding that must be placed in the meetings of the
communal harmony committee, periodically. Police should, when found
necessary, search such places for tracing weapons.
3) The notification under Section 4 of the Arms Act should
be issued in respect of all sensitive, politically and communally riot
prone areas and strict action should be taken against the violators.
4) A state bureau of investigation at the state level and
crime investigation units under it at the district level separated from
the law and order maintenance wing must be established. Persons having
skill, intelligence and aptitude for intelligence collection, crime
detection and investigation should be posted in that bureau and its units
strictly on a merit basis, after conducting aptitude tests, personality
and intelligence tests. Cases involving major crimes should be
investigated by the state bureau of investigation and the units under it.
Modern equipment for investigation (for e.g. narco-analysis,
brain(-mapping), fingerprinting, etc.) should be made available for the
investigation units.
5) Special rules must be framed for the posting and
transfer of officers of the state bureau of investigation, district crime
investigation units and intelligence wings. An officer investigating the
case shall not be transferred during the course of that investigation
except for very compelling reasons. Transfer of key officers must be done
only on extremely good grounds after a sufficiently long time.
6) Just as some other states now have, specified officers
of the intelligence wing should be given operational powers to search
places, arrest the accused, seize material objects and even register the
case. This would help speedy action and prevent incorrect information
being given by the intelligence wing.
7) Intelligence officers should undergo professional
training under central agencies periodically to equip themselves with new
methods of collection and dissemination of intelligence.
8) Separate funds should be provided for the intelligence
wings to be operated by certain designated officers. Modern equipment must
be made available for collection and dissemination of intelligence.
9) Special cells at the state and lower levels must be
formed under senior police officers of proven integrity and ability to
collect information and detect communal, fundamentalist and terrorist
activities in the state. Those units should monitor potentially riot prone
areas and take immediate action. Under such units there should be special
operation wings with officers having secular, impartial credentials and
they should be given special training to deal with communal violence. Such
units must have a riot control scheme.
10) A pre-planned scheme should be made in advance for
communally/politically riot prone areas earmarking places, men, officers,
etc. with respect to their duties and actions to be performed in the event
of a communal incident. They should have periodical simulative exercises
to ensure that the system is foolproof.
11) Modern riot control equipment must be provided in the
control rooms with a reserve force consisting of at least two platoons
available in the control rooms round the clock. The strength of the police
in the communally sensitive and notified areas should be sufficiently
increased by creating new posts.
12) There should be strict and effective policing of the
riot prone areas. Police picket posts/patrolling teams should necessarily
have a sufficient number of local police constables for efficient policing
while using the reserve policemen for reinforcement. There should be an
effective checking system of the personnel detailed in the field day and
night, with a system for cross-checking. Any irregularity when noticed in
field duty or checking must be strictly dealt with.
13) Units of the Rapid Action Force with high mobility,
striking power, fully trained to handle communal riots and equipped with
appropriate weapons, equipment for communication and vehicles in top
condition must be established in all the three ranges in the state.
14) Police control rooms should be equipped with computers
(if this is not already there), which should contain all relevant
information including intelligence information regarding riot prone areas,
fundamentalist/terrorist elements, etc. so that the succeeding officers
could collect such information and initiate action. There should be
meticulous documentation of the inputs for effective analysis assessment
and follow-up action.
15) The lethargy, indiscipline and unaccountability in the
police force has to be removed by strict, intense and constant training
Strict standards of physical fitness should be prescribed and enforced.
Training should be given in existing legal provisions, which affect
policing, and also subjects like criminology, sociological behaviour and
interaction with people.
16) The government should ensure that the police force is
non-political and communally neutral. The political affiliation of the
police should be stopped. The government should consider whether police
associations should continue, at any rate in the present form affecting
its discipline and accountability.
17) Provisions in the Kerala Police (Amendment) Act
regarding conduct of training in weapons by organisations/persons should
be strictly implemented. Violation of the provision must be made a non-bailable
offence.
18) The government shall not permit withdrawal from
prosecution of communal offences, which results in demoralisation of the
police and gives wrong signals to the offenders that they can somehow
escape the arms of the law.
19) There must be proper interaction and coordination
between the civil/police administrations at district levels. The special
branch DySP/asst. commissioner can be posted as liaison officer to the
district administration for the purpose.
20) Guidelines issued by government regarding communal
harmony should be strictly followed. Participation of all members of the
committee in its meetings must be strictly ensured. State level officers
should conscientiously examine the minutes of the meeting on communal
harmony and ensure that the meetings are not an empty formality.
21) Police should have public relations machinery (if it
is not already there) at appropriate levels through which authentic
versions and information regarding incidents or such other matters
connected with the investigation should be revealed to the media. This is
required to prevent publication of rumours and contradictory statements.
Investigating police officers should be prevented from making public
statements or informing the media on incidents or matters under
investigation.
22) There must be appropriate restraint on the media
against publishing unauthenticated information regarding incidents which
tend to promote violence.
23) Special courts must be set up for speedy trial of
cases arising from communal clashes/riots. There must be a time frame for
the investigation, trial and completion of such cases. Law officers with
integrity, impartiality, efficiency and knowledge of law should be
appointed in the special courts to conduct the prosecution of cases.
Parties to the inquiry proceedings
PARTY – A
1. Hindu Aikya Vedi, Kerala, represented by state
organising secretary, Sri M. Radhakrishnan.
2. Marad Araya Samajam, represented by secretary, Sri T.
Suresan.
3. Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Kozhikode Khadakom, represented
by president, Sri PV Karunakaran, Agrasala Kshethram, Court Road,
Kozhikode.
4. Matsya Pravarthaka Sangham, represented by state
secretary, Sri NP Radhakrishnan.
5. Bharatiya Janata Party District Committee, Kozhikode,
represented by president, Sri Chettoor Balakrishnan Master.
6. Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) Kerala Khadakom,
represented by general secretary, Sri AR Mohanan.
7. Sri GK Suresh Babu, chief subeditor, Mathrubhumi
Printing & Publishing Company Ltd., Kollam.
PARTY – B
1. Janata Dal District Committee, Kozhikode, Gandhi Bhavan,
Town Hall Road, Kozhikode - 673 001, represented by president, Sri MK
Premnath.
2. National Development Front, (NDF) Kerala Unity House,
17/569, Rajaji Road, Kozhikode - 673 004, represented by:
i. The chairman – Sri A. Sayeed, s/o Alavi, 17/589, Unity
House, Rajaji Road, Kozhikode - 673 004.
ii. The general secretary – Sri VP Nazarudheen, s/o
Mohammed, 17/589 Unity House, Rajaji Road, Kozhikode - 673 004.
3. Kerala Women’s Front, Malabar House, Kuthukkal Road,
Manjeri, Malappuram district, represented by president, Dr Febina Salam.
4. CPI (M) (Communist Party of India (Marxist)) Beypore
Local Committee, represented by acting secretary, Sri Peroth Prakasan.
5. Sri Puthenpeedikakkal Beeran Koya, president, Beypore
Grama Panchayat.
6. Seemamuntakath Aboobacker Koya, Beypore.
7. Sri C. Moideen Koya, s/o Sri Koyatti, Seemamuntakath
Veedu, Naduvattom amsom, desom, Arakkinar post, Kozhikode taluk.
8. Sri C. Beerankoya, s/o Abdulla, Moolachintakath,
Arakkinar PO, Marad, Kozhikode.
9. Sri T. Devadasan, s/o Sri Sukumaran, Thekkethodi Veedu,
Arakkinar post, Beypore amsom, Naduvattom desom, Kozhikode taluk.
10. Sri M. Ramesan, s/o Swami, Mannadath House, Arakkinar
PO, Marad, Kozhikode.
11. Smt Assara, w/o Erajootty, Erajuvintaketh, Arakkinar
PO, Marad, Kozhikode.
12. Smt T. Sulochana, w/o Sukumaran, Thekkethodi House,
Arakkinar PO, Marad, Kozhikode.
13. Smt K. Leela, w/o Balaraman, Kommadath House,
Koyavalappu Parambu, Arakkinar PO, Marad, Kozhikode.
14. Sri MI Mohammed, member, Beypore Panchayat Board.
15. Muslim League Committee (IUML), Beypore Assembly
Constituency, represented by secretary, Sri Ummer Pandikasala.
16. Confederation of Human Right Organisation, Kerala,
represented by:
i. The chairman, Prof P. Koya.
ii. The secretary general, Sri Mukundan C. Menon.
17. All India Milli Council, Kerala Chapter, represented
by the chairman, Dr P. Sayeed Marickar, s/o Marickar Haji, Kattiparuthi
amsom, Valancherry, Tirur taluk, Malappuram district.
18. Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) District Committee,
Kozhikode, represented by the general secretary, Sri PKK Bava, MLA.
19. CPI (M) District Committee, Kozhikode, represented by
district secretary. Sri VV Dakshina Moorthy.
20. DYFI (Democratic Youth Federation of India) Arakkinar
Unit, represented by area secretary, Sri Ponnath Peethambharan, s/o
Unnipperavan, Sagara Sarani, PO Arakkinar.
21. NCP (Nationalist Congress Party) District Committee,
Kozhikode, represented by president, Sri M. Alikoya.
22. Sunni Yuvajana Sangham (SYS) Beypore Mandalam
Committee, represented by general secretary, Sri PT Ashraf Bakhavi, s/o
Ali Mohammed, Chaliyam.
23. Sri Muhammed Koya, s/o Aboobacker, Musliyarakathu.
Mathottam desom, Naduvattom amsom, Kozhikode taluk.
24. Sri KP Hassan Koya, s/o Amed, Kuniyedath House,
Mathottam desom, Naduvattom amsom, Kozhikode.
25. Samastha Kerala Sunni Yuvajana Sangham (SKSYS) State
Committee, Markaz Complex, Mavoor Road, Calicut, represented by the
executive member, Sri NP Ummer, s/o NP Koya, Cherikkunnummal Thazham,
Vengeri PO, Kozhikode.
26. District Congress (I) Committee, represented by
president, Sri M. Veerankutty, advocate.
27. Communist Party of India (CPI) Kozhikode District
Council, Krishna Pillai Mandiram, Kozhikode - 673 001, represented by
secretary, Sri EK Vijayan.
28. Sri KV Moinkutty @ Moin Bappu, s/o Muhammed Haji
Koyappathodi, Rahath Manzil, Kaimangalm, Palazhi, Kozhikode.
PARTY – C: Commission
PARTY – D: Sri KPA Rasheed, s/o Mammed Koya, Tharammal,
Nallalam PO, Kozhikode.
PARTY – E: Civil administration, Kozhikode,
represented by district collector, Kozhikode.
PARTY – F: City police administration, Kozhikode,
represented by commissioner of police, Kozhikode.
PARTY – G: Sri AM Kassim
PARTY – H
1. The Mahal Committee, Marad Juma Masjid.
2. Sri PP Moideen Koya (Accused No. 141), s/o Abdu Rehiman,
Pareechintakath Veedu, Neermoochil Paramba, Beypore.
3. Sri MC Mayin Haji, s/o Kunhali, Cheruvannur, Kozhikode.
4. Sri TO Sooraj, former district collector, Kozhikode.
5. Sri Sanjiv Kumar Patjoshi, former commissioner of
police, Kozhikode.
6. Sri M. Abdul Raheem, former asst. commissioner of
police (south), Kozhikode.
7. Sri Mahesh Kumar Singla, inspector general (crime),
Trivandrum.
8. The home secretary, government of Kerala, Trivandrum. n
(Thomas P. Joseph Commission Of Inquiry, Report – Volume
I,
dated February 18, 2006, Lakshadweep Building,
Court Complex,
Kozhikode - 673 032.)
.