Funding intolerance
Exporting fundamentalist Islam (Wahhabism) to Muslims elsewhere in the world
emerged, particularly from the 1970s onwards, as a major preoccupation of the
Saudi regime in order to gain legitimacy for the Saudi Arabian monarchy. In
India this has meant the growing clout of puritanical and rigid sects like the
Ahl-i Hadith and the Deobandis. This is bad news for all those concerned with
bridging the growing Hindu-Muslim divide
BY YOGINDER SIKAND
Its claim of representing Islamic ‘orthodoxy’ is the Saudi
regime’s principal tool in seeking ideological le-
gitimacy. Saudi Arabia prides itself on being, as it calls itself, the only
‘truly’ Islamic State in the world, although this claim is stiffly disputed by
many Muslims. Official Saudi Islam, or what is commonly referred to as
‘Wahhabism’ by its opponents, is the outcome of the movement led by the 18th
century puritan Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (1703-91), who, along with Muhammad
ibn Saud, was the chief architect of the Saudi State.
Exporting Wahhabi Islam to Muslims elsewhere in the world
emerged, particularly from the 1970s onwards, as a major preoccupation of the
Saudi regime. This was seen as a vital resource in order to gain legitimacy for
the Saudi Arabian monarchy. Transnational linkages are thus crucial in the
project of contemporary global Wahhabism. Since Wahhabism is seen by its
proponents as the single, ‘authentic’ and ‘normative’ form of Islam, it has an
inherent tendency of expansionism, seeking to impose itself on or replace other
ways of understanding and practising Islam.
As home to a Muslim population of over 150 million, India has
been an important target of Saudi Wahhabi propaganda. Private as well as
semi-official Saudi Arabian assistance has made its way to numerous Indian
Muslim individuals and organisations.
Intra-Sunni rivalry and the
emergence of the Ahl-i Hadith
The establishment of British rule in India had momentous
consequences for notions of Muslim and Islamic identity. The widely shared
perception of Islam being under threat helped promote a feeling of Muslim unity
transcending sectarian and ethnic boundaries. Yet, at the same time, British
rule opened up new spaces for intra-Muslim rivalry. It was in this period that
serious differences emerged within the broader Sunni Muslim fold, leading to the
development of neatly-defined and on numerous issues mutually opposed sect-like
groups, the principal being the Deobandis, the Barelvis and the Ahl-i Hadith.
Each of these groups claimed a monopoly of representing the ‘authentic’ Sunni
tradition, or the Ahl al-Sunnah wal Jamaah, branding rival claimants as aberrant
and, in some cases, even as apostates. This brought to the fore the deeply
fractured and fiercely contested nature of Sunni ‘orthodoxy’.
The pioneers of the Ahl-i Hadith saw themselves as struggling to
promote what they believed to be the ‘true’ Islam of Muhammad and his
companions. Like most other Sunni ulema, they considered the Shias to be
outside the pale of Islam and therefore, kafirs. In addition, they
believed that the other Sunni groups too had strayed from the path of the ‘pious
predecessors’ (salaf).
Overall, they saw their mission as rescuing Muslims from what
they saw as the sin of shirk and guiding them to the ‘pure monotheism’ (khalis
tauhid) of the Prophet and his companions. Most of them were inspired by the
example of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and his companions, particularly
appreciating the Wahhabis’ criticism of popular custom. Yet, they did not
identify themselves as such, refusing the label of Wahhabi that their detractors
used to dismiss them.
Many Hanafi ulema saw the Ahl-i Hadith as a hidden front
of the Wahhabis, whom they regarded as ‘enemies’ of Islam for their fierce
opposition to the adoration of the Prophet and the saints, their opposition to
popular custom and to taqlid, rigid conformity to one or the other of the
four generally accepted schools of Sunni jurisprudence.
Further, they also saw the Ahl-i Hadith as directly challenging
their own claims of representing normative Islam. Numerous Hanafi ulema
issued fatwas branding the Ahl-i Hadith as virtual heretics,
contemptuously referring to them as ghair muqallids for their opposition
to taqlid, which they believed to be integral to established Sunni
tradition. Hanafi opposition to the Ahl-i Hadith was fierce. In many places
Hanafis refused them admittance to their mosques, schools and graveyards.
Marital ties with them were forbidden, and in some places followers of the Ahl-i
Hadith even faced physical assault.
The Saudi-Ahl-i Hadith connection:
Wahhabism as an external policy tool
The 1970s witnessed a growing involvement of certain Arab
states, institutions and private donors in sponsoring a number of Islamic
organisations and institutions in India. This was a direct outcome of the boom
in oil revenues, particularly following the hike in oil prices by OPEC members
in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
Although the precise magnitude of Arab assistance to Indian
Muslim organisations cannot be ascertained, it was certainly significant,
although the Indian press routinely exaggerated it, leading to a scare of
petrodollars flooding the country as part of an alleged grand conspiracy to
convert poor, particularly ‘low’ caste, Hindus to Islam.
In actual fact, few Muslim organisations actually engaged in
missionary work among Hindus received such money. Instead, most Arab, including
Saudi, financial assistance went to Muslim organisations to establish mosques,
madrassas and publishing houses. To a lesser extent, money was channelled
to Muslim organisations to set up schools and hospitals in Muslim localities and
to provide scholarships to needy Muslim students.
Saudi funds for Muslim institutions in India have come through a
range of sources, including the Saudi State, various Saudi-sponsored Islamic
organisations such as the Mecca-based Rabita al-Alami al-Islami (World Muslim
League) and the Dar ul-Ifta wal Dawat ul-Irshad, as well as private donors,
mostly rich sheikhs, some with close links to the Saudi ruling family. Several
Indian Muslims working in Saudi Arabia in various capacities also send back
money to fund Islamic institutions, based mainly in towns and villages where
their families live.
Monetary assistance to selected Islamic institutions is only one
method through which the Saudis have sought to patronise and influence key
Muslim leaders and opinion makers in India. Other forms of assistance include
sponsored Haj pilgrimages for Muslim leaders, including ulema,
patronising of selected publishing houses, scholarships for madrassa
students to study in Saudi Islamic universities and jobs for such graduates in
both the private as well as public sector within Saudi Arabia.
The largest beneficiary of this largesse is believed to be the
Ahl-i Hadith, although the Jamaat-i Islami and the Deobandis are also said to
have benefited to some extent. The Barelvis and the Shias, both of whom regard
Wahhabism as wholly heretical, have received little or no financial support at
all from Saudi sources. This itself suggests that Saudi finance to Muslim
institutions in India is intended to serve and promote a particular ideological
vision of Islam, one that ties in with the interests of the Saudi regime and its
official Wahhabi ulema.
Saudi Arabia emerged as a significant sponsor of Islamic
institutions internationally, including in India, only in the 1970s. This was a
period of intense ideological struggle in the Arab world. Arab socialism and
pan-Arab nationalism under Nasser in Egypt and the Baathists in Syria and Iraq
and various communist parties active in numerous Arab states all called for the
overthrow of monarchical regimes in the region, which they saw as lackeys of the
United States and as helping the Zionist occupation of Palestine. Within Saudi
Arabia itself voices of dissent and protest emerged, including from those who
had been influenced by socialist trends elsewhere in the region.
Then came the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, which led to
fears of an export of revolutionary, anti-monarchical Islam to the Arab world,
including to Saudi Arabia. Ayatollah Khomeini vehemently denounced the Saudi
kingdom, insisting that Islam had no place for monarchical rule. He also
bitterly attacked the Saudis for being American stooges and for willingly
acquiescing in American support for Israel.
In his will, made public in 1989, he denounced the Saudi regime
as ‘anti-Islamic’, claiming that it was in league with ‘Satanic powers’. He
argued that Wahhabism represented ‘anti-Koranic ideas’ and a ‘baseless,
superstitious cult’, and was aimed at destroying Islam from within. Radical
appeals emanating from Tehran, including anti-Wahhabi and anti-Saudi sentiments,
soon captured the imagination of Muslims all over the world.
The Iranian Revolution played the role of a major catalyst in
moulding Saudi foreign policy, in which the export of its official Wahhabi form
of Islam emerged as a key instrument. The anti-monarchical thrust of the
Revolution was seen by the Saudi regime as a menacing threat. If the Shah of
Iran, America’s closest and strongest ally in the region, could be overthrown as
a result of the passionate appeals of a charismatic Imam, the Saudi rulers, it
was painfully realised, could well meet the same fate. Consequently, the Saudis,
backed by the Americans, began investing heavily in promoting Wahhabi Islam
abroad in order to counter the appeal of the Iranian Revolution, both within
Saudi Arabia itself and abroad.
Stressing the regime’s ‘Islamic’ credentials now came to be
relied upon as the principal tool to strengthen it and to stave off challenges
from internal as well as external opponents, from Muslims opposed to the
regime’s corrupt and dictatorial ways and its close alliance with the
imperialist powers, principally the United States. Saudi export of Wahhabism was
given a further boost with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when the Saudis,
supported by the Americans, pumped in millions of dollars to fund Wahhabi-style
schools and organisations in Pakistan in order to train guerrillas to fight the
Russians. While such assistance, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, was presented as
a sign of Saudi Arabia’s professed commitment to ‘true’ Islam, it also
functioned as a thinly veiled guise for promoting the interests of the Saudi
regime. In exporting this brand of Islam abroad, India, home to the second
largest Muslim community in the world, received particular importance.
The sort of Islam that the Saudis began aggressively promoting
abroad, including in India, in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, had
a number of characteristic features. It was extremely literalist; it was rigidly
and narrowly defined, being concerned particularly with issues of ‘correct’
ritual and belief, rather than with wider social and political issues; it was
viciously sectarian, branding dissenting groups, such as Shias and followers of
the Sufis as ‘enemies’ of Islam; and, finally, it was explicitly and fiercely
critical of ideologies and groups, Muslim as well as other, that were regarded
as political threats to the Saudi regime. Accordingly, these were routinely
castigated as ploys of the ‘enemies of Islam’.
Saudi patronage and the Indian
Ahl-i Hadith
A hugely disproportionate amount of Saudi aid to Indian Muslim
groups in the decades after the Iranian Revolution is said to have gone to
institutions run by the Ahl-i Hadith. This is hardly surprising, given the
shared ideological tradition and vision of the Ahl-i Hadith and the Saudi
Wahabbis. One result of the generous Saudi patronage of the Indian Ahl-i Hadith
has been that there has been a growing convergence between the latter and the
Saudi Wahhabi ulema, so much so that today there is hardly any difference
between the two groups.
Saudi finance to Indian Ahl-i Hadith institutions has heavily
influenced the contents of the vast amount of literature that they produce and
distribute. In the last two decades there has been a mushroom growth in the
number of Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India. Several of them are said to
receive Saudi funds, directly or otherwise. Many of them produce low-priced
books, and, now, audio tapes, video cassettes and compact discs, and some even
operate their own web sites. Most of the authors whose works they publish are
Indian and, to a lesser extent, Pakistani Ahl-i Hadith ulema who have
received higher education in various Saudi universities.
Several of them are currently working in various official as
well as private Islamic organisations in Saudi Arabia itself. Their vision and
understanding of Islam is indelibly shaped by their own experiences in Saudi
Arabia. They see the Saudi Wahhabi version of Islam as normative and other forms
of Islam as deviant.
Much of the literature produced by Indian Ahl-i Hadith
publishing houses focusses on the minutiae of ritual practices and beliefs. This
is a reflection, in part, of the overwhelmingly literalist understanding of
Saudi Wahhabi Islam. Scores of books penned by Ahl-i Hadith ulema are
devoted to intricate discussion of what they regard as the ‘correct’ methods of
praying, performing ablutions and offering supplications, as well as rules and
regulations related to food, dress, marriage, divorce and so on.
A principle purpose of these publications is to attack rival
Muslim, including Sunni, groups, and to sternly condemn them as ‘aberrant’ on
account of differences in their methods of performing rituals and their rules
governing a range of issues related to normative personal and collective
behaviour.
Another interesting feature of the literature produced by Ahl-i
Hadith publishing houses in India, and one that is directly linked to the close
association between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Saudi Wahabbis, is a fierce
hostility to local beliefs and practices. This hostility, while having been a
defining feature of the early Ahl-i Hadith, has been further exacerbated with
the growing Saudi-Ahl-i Hadith nexus. In recent years Ahl-i Hadith scholars have
penned scores of books and tracts sternly denouncing customs that many Indian
Muslims share with their Hindu neighbours, a legacy of their pre-Islamic past.
These also include customs, such as those associated with
popular Sufism and the cults of the saints, which enabled Islam to take root in
India and to adjust to the Indian cultural context. As Ahl-i Hadith writers see
it, these are all ‘wrongful innovations’, having no sanction in the Prophet’s
sunnah, and hence must be rooted out. In their place they advocate an
adoption of a range of Arab cultural norms and practices which are seen as
genuinely ‘Islamic’.
The publication of Urdu translations of the compendia of
fatwas of leading Saudi Wahhabi ulema by Indian Ahl-i Hadith
publishing houses is a reflection of this cultural alternative that they seek to
provide to take the place of what they see as ‘un-Islamic’ practices widely
prevalent among many Indian Muslims. This has added to the conflict with other
Muslim groups, most particularly with the Barelvis, who are associated with the
cults of the Sufis. The ‘Saudi Arabisation’ of Islam and Indian Muslim culture
that the Ahl-i Hadith seeks to promote also inevitably further widens the
cultural chasm between Muslims and Hindus.
As many Ahl-i Hadith ulema see it, and this is reflected
in their writings as well, Hinduism is hardly different from the pagan religion
of the Arabs of the pre-Islamic Jahiliya period. Although most of them do not
advocate conflict with Hindus, some Ahl-i Hadith scholars insist on the need for
Muslims to have as little to do with the Hindus as possible, for fear of the
‘deleterious’ consequences this might have for the Muslims’ own commitment to
and practice of Islam.
Like other Muslim groups, Indian Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses
have also paid particular attention to combating their Muslim rivals. This
cannot be understood without taking into account the Saudi connection. Scores of
books have been penned by Indian Ahl-i Hadith ulema, branding Sufis,
Shias and Deobandis as heretical.
Tirelessly claiming in their writings to being the sole
representatives of ‘normative’ Islam and, in the process, identifying themselves
with the Saudi Wahhabi ulema, enables the Indian Ahl-i Hadith ulema
to present themselves as faithful allies of the Saudis, which in turn helps earn
them recognition as well as monetary assistance from Saudi sponsors. In
addition, such publications also serve the purpose of presenting the Saudi
Wahhabi version of Islam as normative, and in putting forward the claim of the
Saudi regime to being the only one in the world sincerely and seriously
committed to ‘genuine’ Islam.
Access to Saudi funds has therefore led to heightened conflict
between various Muslim sectarian groups in India, as Ahl-i Hadith publishing
houses produce and distribute literature on a large scale bitterly attacking
their rivals of being Muslim only in name.
Heightened intra-Muslim polemics within India are not unrelated
to the interests of the Saudi regime. Thus, the virulently anti-Shia and
anti-Sufi propaganda material churned out by various Ahl-i Hadith publishing
houses in India, some of this said to be sponsored by Saudi patrons, serves the
purpose of denouncing as outside the pale of Islam Muslim groups who are opposed
to Wahhabism and the Saudi State, these often being branded as ‘enemies’ of
Islam. In this way the literature produced by several Ahl-i Hadith publishing
houses in India helps promote a version and vision of Islam that is almost
identical to that of the Wahabbis of Saudi Arabia, and hence one that fits in
with the interests of both the Saudi Wahhabi ulema as well as the Saudi
State.
The claim of the Saudi monarchy as representing the sole
‘authentic’ Islamic regime in the world is repeatedly stressed in several Ahl-i
Hadith writings, and reflects the close links, ideological as well as financial,
between several Indian Ahl-i Hadith leaders and the Saudi State and its official
Wahhabi ulema.
Numerous books penned by Indian Ahl-i Hadith scholars discuss in
detail the ‘great’ contributions of the present rulers of Saudi Arabia to the
‘Islamic cause’, inevitably concluding with the claim that Saudi Arabia under
its present masters represents the only ‘truly’ Islamic State in the world
today. They also make it a point to call on God to bless the Saudi king and pray
for his continued rule. The Saudi monarch is invariably presented as a pious,
fully committed Muslim, whose sole concern is, so it is sought to be argued, the
protection and promotion of ‘authentic’ Islam. Support for this ‘authentic’
Islam and for the Saudi rulers are presented as indivisible.
Interestingly, there is no reference at all in Ahl-i Hadith
writings to the widespread dissatisfaction within Saudi Arabia itself with the
ruling family. Nor is there any reference to the rampant corruption in the
country, the lavish lifestyles of the princes, and to Saudi Arabia’s close links
with the United States.
Nor, still, is there ever any mention of the claim, put forward
by many Muslims, that monarchy is ‘un-Islamic’, particularly one like the
despotic and corrupt Saudi regime. This is added evidence of the fact that
Saudi-sponsored propaganda abroad is tailor-made to suit the interests of its
ruling family.
Ahl-i Hadith-Deobandi polemics and the Saudi nexus
As a claimant to Sunni ‘orthodoxy’, the Ahl-i Hadith is not
alone in denouncing the Shias as heretics and therefore outside the pale of
Islam. In fact, many Deobandi and Barelvi ulema share the same opinion.
Hence the virulent opposition to the Shias on the part of the Ahl-i Hadith is
hardly surprising. Given its commitment to what it sees as ‘pure’ monotheism and
its fierce opposition to ‘wrongful innovations’, its denunciation of the
Barelvis, who are associated with the cults of the Sufis, is also
understandable.
What seems particularly intriguing, however, is the fact that,
of late, Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India have been devoting particular
attention to denouncing the Deobandis who, while being muqallids as well
as proponents of a reformed Sufism, share with the Ahl-i Hadith a commitment to
strict compliance with the Shariah and the extirpation of what they describe as
bidaah. In that sense, the Ahl-i Hadith are closer in doctrinal terms to
the Deobandis than to any other Indian Sunni group. Despite this, it appears
that in recent years Indian Ahl-i Hadith scholars have been focussing
considerably more attention on combating the Deobandis than critiquing their
Barelvi and Shia rivals. This seemingly puzzling development begs an
explanation.
One possible reason for this is that the Deobandis in India are
far more organised and influential than the Barelvis. The Deobandis manage a
number of influential organisations, madrassas and publishing houses all
over India. Consequently, they have probably been more effective in critiquing
the Ahl-i Hadith than their other rivals, which in turn has forced the Ahl-i
Hadith to pay particular attention to the challenge they face from the Deobandi
front. In addition to this factor are other developments, related to struggles
over money, influence and authority, which have made for a sharp intensification
of rivalries between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Deobandis in recent years. The
Saudi connection seems to have played a major role in abetting these conflicts.
The Deobandis, by and large, seem to have maintained the
somewhat ambiguous attitude of their elders towards the Ahl-i Hadith and the
Wahabbis till at least the late 1970s, when the situation began to change with
new access to Saudi funding. In the course of the Afghan war against the
Soviets, the Saudis recognised that the Deobandis were far more influential and
had a far larger presence than the Ahl-i Hadith in both Pakistan as well as
Afghanistan. Consequently, much Saudi funding began making its way to Deobandi
madrassas in Pakistan in order to train guerrilla fighters armed with a
passion for jehad against the Russians. A shared commitment to a Shariah-centric
Islam made such assistance acceptable to both parties.
Impact of recent developments on Saudi links with Indian Muslim
groups
The 1990s were characterised by fierce polemical battles between
the Ahl-i Hadith and the Deobandis in India, with each group charging the other
of being ‘anti-Islamic’ and as hidden fronts of the ‘enemies’ of Islam. Although
the two groups continue to regard each other as fierce rivals, the sharp
polemical exchanges between them now seem to have dampened somewhat. One factor
for this is probably the strong need that many Muslims feel to present a united
front to combat the challenge of aggressive Hindu groups in the country.
Another important factor for the apparent decline in overt
strife between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Deobandis in recent years is what seems
to be a significant shift in Saudi strategy. Following the events of September
2001, Saudi Arabia came under tremendous pressure from the United States to
clamp down on Wahhabi militants at home and abroad. The Saudi strategy of
sponsoring radical Wahhabism seemed to have boomeranged, as a new generation of
Islamist radicals emerged within Saudi Arabia itself, critiquing the Saudi
regime for its corruption and for its close links with the United States.
Consequently, the Saudi Arabians were forced to take action against their own
internal radical Islamist opponents, realising the major challenge that they
posed to the Saudi monarchy.
Simultaneously, and because of these developments, Saudi aid to
Wahhabi groups abroad, including India, is said to have declined somewhat. This
will naturally have a major impact on relations between different Muslim groups
in India, and will most notably impact on the expansion of the Ahl-i Hadith, who
have been the major recipient of Saudi assistance in recent years.
Another possible indication of the shift in Saudi strategy is
the fact that of late certain Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India have
brought out books praising the Saudi State and critiquing what they describe as
the ‘terrorists’ who wish to weaken it. These books argue that the ‘correct’
method of the political ‘reform’ that Islamist opponents of the regime seek is
not through violence but rather through ‘guiding’ the political authorities to
follow the path of God by providing them with ‘Islamic’ advice.
This shows how Islam is conveniently marshalled and often
interpreted in diametrically opposing ways by the Saudi regime to suit its own
strategic and ideological purposes abroad. Saudi Arabia is said to have been the
largest financier of radical Islamist groups abroad, some of whom, as in the
Philippines, Chechnya, Bosnia and Kashmir, have taken to armed struggle and
terrorism against non-Muslim States. Saudi-funded literature routinely extols
such groups as mujahids engaged in a legitimate Islamic jehad.
Yet, faced now with its own internal and increasingly vocal Islamist opposition,
it considers similar movements within Saudi Arabia as major sources of ‘strife’
and as clearly ‘un-Islamic’. Whether, as a result of increasing international
pressure, the Saudis will be willing to extend the same logic to Islamist groups
abroad whom they have been patronising for many years is a moot point. n
(This article is an excerpt from the writer’s monograph,
"Intra-Muslim Rivalries in India and the Saudi Connection" which can be accessed
from his web site www.islaminterfaith.org).
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