Jan- Feb 2002 
Cover Story

Jihadis vs. ‘professionals’

The army’s attitude towards jihadi groups was in large part a response to the fact that the proliferation of armed jihadi groups was a direct challenge to the army’s monopoly 
of armed force in society

BY  HAMZA ALAVI

To understand what has been going on, to be gin with, we should recognise and analyse the divisions and tussles within the Pakistani army itself. There are two trends in the army. During the British period, because the colonial power wanted Indian officers in the army to be unaffected by nationalist ideology, they promoted instead an ideology of army ‘professionalism’.

When Pakistan was created, that ideology continued in a slightly modified form. The top brass in the army added to the notion of ‘professionalism’ the idea of supremacy of the army over society, especially politicians whom they had learnt to despise during the colonial period itself. This ideology is by its nature ‘secular’, or I might say ‘not ideologically religious’.

When Zia came on the scene he went to great lengths to promote Islamic ideology in the army… For a time this trend was quite strong. But the Islamists, strong as they became at the time, had not yet succeeded in pushing the ‘professionals’ (as I would call them) out from positions of control in the army.

Fed up with that and impatient, the Islamists attempted a coup in 1995, led by one Major General Zahirul Islam Abbasi. They wanted to ‘Islamise the army and the country. That attempt by the Islamists gave an opportunity to the professionals to remove quite a few of the Islamists. But, by and large, many Islamists remained, some in senior positions. Some Islamists were, of course, more fanatical than others.

Musharraf clearly belongs to the category of ‘professionals’. He is a pragmatist, for whom army interests are uppermost. But he does use the vocabulary of secularism. That vocabulary is currently quite useful for them. In the name of secularism (and Jinnah) they bolster their position vis–à–vis the Islamists.

Let us not forget that Musharraf was the author of Kargil. I would say that the Kargil episode, foolish and counter–productive as it was, was anti–Indian rather than Islamist. When Musharraf seized power, you might recall his speech when he said that Kamal Ataturk was his personal hero and he also tried (unsuccessfully) to modify the Blasphemy law.

The Islamists were too powerful then… The spate of sectarian killings in the summer of 2001 (months before the US declared its ‘War Against Terrorism’) gave Musharraf the opening that he was waiting for. He read the riot act to the mullahs at a Seerat conference in June 2001 and again on August 14 (Pakistan’s Independence Day). He banned the Lashkar–e–Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Mohammad and also put Sipah–e–Sahaba on notice.

I would point out that the army’s attitude towards jihadi groups was in large part a response to the fact that the proliferation of armed jihadi groups was a direct challenge to the army’s monopoly of armed force in society. That, I believe was a major factor impelling the army on a warpath against jihadis.

America’s ‘War on Terrorism’ after Sept. 11, gave the professionals an opportunity to deal effectively with the Islamists. With American backing, they retired or transferred Islamist officers some of whom were very powerful indeed, such as Lt. Gen Mahmud Ahmad, the head of ISI, who was an extremely powerful ideological Islamist, with ambitions of becoming the top man in the army.

There is a general absence of analysis and recognition of such conflicts and contradictions within the army. It would be facile to say that the actions against Islamist and Jihadi groups by the Musharraf government, beginning from the summer of 2001 (if not Musharraf’s declarations from the outset) are due simply to American pressure. That would be a gross over-simplification. The struggle between the two groups of army officers was much older than that. As for the Jaish–e–Mohammad and Lashkar–e–Toiba, they were blamed by the Indians for the Dec. 13 attack on the Indian Parliament. Leaders and activists of both were promptly arrested by Musharraf. But he said they had been arrested not for the Delhi attack but for unspecified ‘other reasons’. Try and believe that!

(Excerpted from Hamza Alavi’s intervention in a group discussion on the Internet).
(The writer is a well–known Pakistani sociologist and former professor at Manchester University, UK)