The people & their shepherds

BY IA REHMAN

True to their style of governance, the custodians of power in India and Pakistan are all set to discuss matters affect ing the present and the future of one–fifth of the world’s population without giving the latter a clear idea of what they are up to.

Both heads of authority have no doubt been going through the motions of briefing their political rivals as well as supporters on their views on issues likely to come up at the summit meeting. These exercises can hardly be described as consultations aimed at developing national consensuses in people’s interest. They are nearly always designed by a ruling caucus to inform the various elements in the political spectrum of its adherence to national objectives in order to avoid the charge of its trying to go alone on crucial matters. Those admitted to hearings are interested in receiving early warning of the likely impact of official initiatives on their own prospects in the endless power game. Since opposition parties/groups/individuals find it expedient to warn the authorities against compromising what is described as national interest, the hard–liners usually get reinforced. Otherwise, there is little to suggest that Vajpayee or Musharraf have received advice to prefer people’s agenda for peace to their own plans to outmanoeuvre one another at the negotiating table, to say nothing of their amenability to such advice if rendered.

The myth that these briefings equip the top interlocutors with national unanimity on issues before them does not stand the barest of scrutiny. The Vajpayee-Musharraf discussions have a direct bearing on their domestic politics. It is difficult to believe that all shades of opinion in India find common good in the sangh parivar’s perception of the people’s glory. In the case of Pakistan the myth of national consensus rests on an even more wobbly premise. The General’s list of participants for the briefing did not include the two largest parties of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto – the former was not invited and the latter prevailed upon the broad alliance for restoration of democracy to decline the invitation, even though its head had earlier risked his reputation by holding a one–to–one meeting with the General. Now the regime is claiming that its brief on relations with India in general and on Kashmir in particular enjoys the support of all who matter, especially the leaders of religious factions, a claim that can only cause anxiety to peace groups in Pakistan. A brew that can be equally relished by militant clerics and secular democrats in Pakistan is not available anywhere.

True, parliamentarians and leaders of political groups can be accepted as representatives of their people. But only on routine matters which fall within an already existing national consensus, however notional it may be. But establishing peace between India and Pakistan is an extraordinary mission whose success will obviously depend upon public preparedness to accept whatever means are agreed upon. The fact is that neither side has taken its people into confidence on the practical measures it is willing to take or even on a shared vision of South Asia in the years to come. The risks in such strategies are obvious.

Another reason for public unease is its understanding of the factors contributing to the two sides’ decision to meet. However hard any side may deny it, the fact of external persuasion cannot be concealed. After all, the US role in facilitating the Lahore summit between Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif is well known. The huge gains a settlement with Pakistan will yield to the Indian state are manifestly clear. There is no reason to doubt Vajpayee’s wish to go down in history as a peace–maker without a peer. General Musharraf has obviously seen in the summit a means of containing his legitimacy crisis and of salvaging his country out of a severe economic crunch. None of these objectives is politically questionable, but these will yield benefits only to the states or their leaderships. 

South Asians know only too well that state prestige or glory cannot always be translated into public weal. The fundamental issue is: To what extent can the summiteers bring their concepts of state priorities or their political interests in harmony with the most basic aspirations of their peoples?

The gap between state–oriented agendas and the people–friendly agenda is easily visible. The media, particularly in India, has tried to fill the void caused by official reluctance to disclose its agenda or the extent of give and take the two sides will be prepared to accept. The atmosphere of a kite–flying carnival notwithstanding it has become clear that while the states are concentrating on specific issues the people at large are concerned with long–term ideals. For instance, while the officials are debating on possible formulas to end the contest on Kashmir, the people have their eyesight on the imperatives of goodwill and friendship between the two closest South Asian neighbours within a framework that does justice to the Kashmiris on both sides of the artificial divide and revives hopes of advancement for the entire population of the subcontinent. From the latter perspective a settlement on Kashmir is not an end in itself but a means to a higher goal of our two people’s liberation from the legacy of mutually destructive antagonism, hatred and prejudice.

The fact that media reports have revealed a groundswell of popular sentiment in favour of India–Pakistan friendship cannot be denied. Many groups in both countries may be sceptical about the summit outcome but public enthusiasm for talks should oblige the negotiators to avoid giving the impression of failure. But they must also guard against the hazards of claiming progress in terms that do not meet with people’s expectations.

What are these expectations? The people want the peace dividends to be spelt out. On both sides of the border they are sick of five decades of confrontation which has caused their impoverishment and denial of a life of basic human dignity. They will not be content with a bare agreement on good neighbourly relations between the two states. They want to be freed of the spectre of nuclear annihilation, indeed of any danger of their young ones being called up to sacrifice their lives for senseless conflicts. They want resources to be diverted from defence to the social sector. They want to be guaranteed fair opportunities to fight hunger, disease and unemployment. They want an end to unjust laws and the deeply detested bureaucratic–goonda raj. Above all they want the freedom to get rid of the shepherds that have behaved worse than wolves.