Winds of change? 

Peace on the subcontinent is an idea whose time has come. But  can Vajpayee and Musharraf – both backed by hardliners – set the process in motion?

BY ADMIRAL L RAMDAS  (WITH LALITA RAMDAS)

Ever since Prime Minister Vajpayee invited General Musharraf for talks, there has been no dearth of comments, observations, fears, suspicions, and a host of other opinions articulated on both sides of the border. The entire print and electronic media has been feverishly engaged in projecting these views and adding their own ‘edits’. 
Not so well published, but no less committed, have been the statements of various peoples’ groups, like PIPFPD (Pakistan India Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy), PPC (Pakistan Peace Coalition), CNDP (Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace), APSA (Association of Peoples of Asia), KHOJ–AMAN (the South Asia studies and Peacepals programme working with school children) WIPSA (Women’s Initiative for Peace in South Asia), and IPSI (India–Pakistan Soldiers’ Initiative for Peace) to name just a few. 

These and other groups, together with their affiliates, represent all those from among the less visible sections of our societies. They have worked consistently and quietly, often under the toughest of circumstances, to change existing perceptions of ‘the other’ and to put peace on the agendas of the leadership as well as the people in both India and Pakistan. 

A complex combination of factors drew me into a set of activities which are, by any yardstick unorthodox, for a former chief of staff. These have evolved from my own convictions and belief in the values of humanism, secularism and democracy, and also the influences from my family who were deeply committed to a range of peoples initiatives in education, gender, environment and social justice. After my retirement as chief of the naval staff in 1993, we moved to live in a rural area, involved ourselves with local issues, and joined up with several existing initiatives for better relations between India and Pakistan. 

The transition into this kind of work, after an entire lifetime in uniform in the Indian navy, has enabled me to learn a lot about peoples’ views and aspirations on the one hand, while trying to relate it to the area where I operated for over four decades — namely the various wings of government on the other. The chasm between these two worlds is wide indeed and it has been an enormous challenge to straddle both sides of the spectrum. 

Perhaps a service background helps one to understand somewhat better the possible dynamics of a meeting between a military President and a civilian Prime Minister. Military minds the world over are but products of the environment in which they have grown, and therefore it would be useful to examine the various forms of governance in South Asia. Three of our closest neighbours — namely Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar — have had military governments for fairly long periods of time. We also have two monarchies in this region — namely Nepal and Bhutan. 

Even among the remaining three, namely Maldives, Sri Lanka and India, there are differing systems of democracy. Maldives and Sri Lanka have a presidential form of government, with powers vested mainly in the person of the President, whereas India has adopted the ‘Westminster’ model of parliamentary democracy. The military has had a significant role in the governance of our neighbouring countries —especially in Myanmar and Pakistan. The Pakistani military mind therefore has developed on a different trajectory to that of the Indian Armed Forces. This, as we will see, has a significant bearing on any interaction with Pakistan.

Despite these trends in the region, the military in India has continued to honour and respect civil authority and the principle of democratic rule. Within this framework, however, and while executing the legitimate decisions of the elected government of the day, it should not be forgotten that members of the armed forces do also have minds of their own. Military personnel do cast their votes, and thereby give expression to their political affiliations. 

I have chosen to elaborate this point primarily to illuminate the subtle combination of factors that have influenced the military mind in India over the past five decades. This explains the recent phenomenon of a number of former military personnel joining political parties. Some, like myself, have opted to act on my political convictions through active participation in several civil society movements.  The Indian military (both in and out of uniform) is in many ways uniquely positioned to enable confidence building and improving bilateral relations. These strengths should be harnessed for furthering Indo–Pak friendship and understanding.

Over a decade ago, during my tenure as chief of the naval staff, I had advocated a number of initiatives for promoting regional co–operation – one of which was the path–breaking International Maritime Seminar on ‘Indian Ocean — Challenges and Opportunities’ — organised in Delhi by the Navy Foundation in September 1992.
In my valedictory address, I outlined my basic vision, envisaging a future where “amity and co–operation will replace adversarial postures, and countries of this region will become the arbiters of their own destiny without external interference or pressures. As a cohesive entity, the regional states will have a greater say in world affairs, and possibly greater bargaining power in commerce and trade.” In this context I had proposed the formation of  `an Indian Ocean Panchayat’ and I quote: “My proposal is for countries of the region to come together and evolve an Indian Ocean Panchayat whose aim would be to foster regional co–operation on a wide range of issues for mutual benefit of the member states. The Panchayat would also ensure the avoidance of mutual interference in many areas and thus prevent conflict.” The seeds of the evolution of the organisation of Indian Ocean Rim Countries perhaps lay here.

On retirement therefore, I did not find it contradictory in any way to become what some loosely call a ‘peace–nik’ — although I prefer the word ‘Peace maker’.

My oft–articulated and well-known stand against nuclear weapons is also a logical development of my larger vision of peace and development, primarily of our region, and the world as a whole. It is within this broad framework that I will examine the forthcoming summit and flag some key factors which are likely to influence this meeting:

Ø Historical Background, and Perceptions of each other.
ØImpact of nuclear weapon-isation of India and Pakistan. 
Ø Regional security issues. 
Ø Jammu and Kashmir. 
Ø Implementation of agreements. 
Ø Current scenario and imperatives for the summit.

Historical background and perceptions of each other:
Seeds of continuing discord and animosity between our two newly independent countries dates back to the partition of India into two separate nation states by Britain, without any reference to ‘the people ‘ or their wishes. This situation is not very different from what is being faced today by the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Since 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three-and-a-half wars — 1948, 1965, 1971; the most recent one being in Kargil in 1999. They have all proved to be totally counter–productive. The emergence of the new nation of Bangladesh from the erstwhile eastern wing of Pakistan in 1971, had dealt a severe blow to the Pakistani psyche as a whole, and to the armed forces in particular. Pakistan has not forgotten the role played by India in this development.

Kargil, which happened within months of signing of the Lahore Declaration in February 1999, has likewise generated a feeling of betrayal by Pakistan, in the Indian psyche. General Musharraf, now the President of Pakistan, has been identified as the mastermind behind Kargil, and therefore held in deep suspicion by the Indians. Given this background, the initiative and courage displayed by the Indian Prime Minister in inviting the general for the forthcoming summit talks is indeed noteworthy. 

Impact of nuclear weaponisation in India and Pakistan:
An entirely new and dangerous dimension was created by India’s Pokhran II nuclear tests in May 1998, followed by Pakistan’s response in Chagai. This was followed by India’s announcement of its intent to acquire and deploy nuclear weapons as a ‘security imperative’ against China and Pakistan.

Predictably, similar ‘security concerns’  were echoed by Pakistan soon thereafter in respect of India. In any future discussions with Pakistan regarding regional security, one will have to address India’s concerns regarding the ‘Chinese nuclear threat’. Given the track record of wars between our two countries, it would be reasonable to expect that the military option may be exercised again. However, this time, the risks that both nations run, due to the possession of nuclear weapons, is very high indeed, with potentially disastrous results. The imperative for the two leaders during this summit is to come to an understanding regarding nuclear weapons, their management and safety. 

The minimum requirement would be to freeze all activities related to nuclear weapons with the final objective of complete nuclear disarmament both at the regional and the global levels. This is an area where certainly both India and Pakistan can jointly take some new and bold initiatives for revitalising the global nuclear disarmament programme and thereby furthering the cause of regional security.
Regional security issues:

To be able to better understand regional security matters, it would also be useful to examine the broad ‘military security’ concerns of the main players in this arena–namely China, India and Pakistan. The United States as a global power has an overarching influence in the entire region. Whilst Pakistan’s concerns of military security are primarily India specific, India’s concerns include both China and Pakistan. India is also conscious of the US naval presence in the Arabian Sea and in the Pacific and this therefore gets factored into India’s security calculus. 
China’s security concerns are largely centred on the USA, to a lesser degree with Russia, and even less with India. India and China have shared a conflict free relationship in almost five thousand years of history. The only exception was the India–China border conflict in 1962 — and this too was due primarily to the artificial boundaries etched by the British. Despite China having possessed nuclear weapons since 1964, it has to date never threatened India with it. 

The huge military expenditures incurred by all the players are currently being justified based on the threat perceptions outlined above. The persistent and sinister role of the military industrial complex to push sales of weapons and equipment is another factor worth noting. Clearly the security requirements of China, India and Pakistan are closely linked and should logically therefore lead to a tri–lateral discussion and the emergence of a strategic partnership. 

Whilst this concept may seem a little far–fetched at this stage, it is a pre-requisite to the establishment of a stable security environment in the Asian region. Asian genius must find its own answers to its security concerns. Hopefully some thought will be given to this as well during the forthcoming summit, since this critical dimension is not often addressed. 

Jammu & Kashmir:
Ever since the military intervention by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 there have been many acts of omission and commission committed by both governments of India and Pakistan which need not be re–stated at this stage. 

Much water has flown under the bridge since then — which has brought us to the present day impasse. Events may never have unfolded this way had the UN directions been implemented immediately and faithfully by both sides in 1948. The resultant hostility has permeated and vitiated the entire atmosphere of Indo–Pak relations and continues to this day. 

The Indo–Pak war of 1971 dealt a body blow to the Pakistani military psyche. This was followed shortly thereafter by India’s ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ in Pokhran, in 1974. Both these developments contributed significantly to the concept of a ‘proxy war’ in the Valley. The situation in both parts of Kashmir has deteriorated over the last decade due to the unimaginative way in which the government of India has handled things — namely by inducting more and more security forces only to accentuate and worsen the existing alienation among the people. Pakistan meanwhile has been unable to provide any form of stable civilian democratic rule within Pakistan, and also in Kashmir under their control. 

The tragic events in Afghanistan gave rise to the Taliban movement which was the joint creation of both the United States of America and Pakistan. This genie which has been let out of the bottle, is proving to be dangerous and uncontrollable, and therefore needs to be tackled jointly by both India and Pakistan as a potential security threat to the region.

Implementation of agreements:
India and Pakistan, have however, despite this continuing face–off, managed to conclude various agreements and treaties over the years.  Some of these are listed below:

Ø The Indus Water Treaty – 1960.
Ø The Tashkent Declaration – 1966.
Ø The Shimla Agreement – 1972.
Ø The Lahore Declaration – 1999.

Whilst some of these agreements continue to work well, Tashkent, Shimla and Lahore agreements/declarations have failed because neither side honoured its commitments made therein. The lesson to be learnt is that there should be a monitoring and implementing agency which would, in my view, provide the requisite checks and balances to ensure proper and timely actions by both countries. The initial rejection of the Lahore Declaration by the general soon after he took over in October 1999, was an additional factor which widened the gulf between our two countries. Leadership changes should not be used as an excuse for non-compliance with agreements entered into by two sovereign states. Hopefully this issue will be addressed in the forthcoming Agra Summit.

Current scenario and imperatives for the summit:
There is always a symbiotic relationship between domestic compulsions and constraints and foreign policy. More often than not, leaders and governments tend to divert domestic attention in times of crisis by raising the bogey of an external threat. This is particularly so when the socio–economic conditions are bad, or when the political leadership feels insecure. Both in India and Pakistan today, strange as it may sound, there is a fair amount of similarity in the rather fragile political situation that prevails. Whilst in Pakistan the General is trying desperately to legitimise his usurpation of power; the National Democratic Alliance in India is ‘creaking’. 

The Jammu and Kashmir situation is indeed of great concern and importance to both countries because this has meant huge social, economic, and human costs to both our countries. There is clearly a realisation that the continued spiralling of expenditure on defence cannot be sustained for very much longer — perhaps more evident right now in Pakistan because of their current economic crunch. This feeling of insecurity was noticeable in Pakistan during my recent visits.

I have been to Pakistan three times since 1998. The first visit was as chairperson of the Indian Chapter, to attend the fourth joint convention of the Pakistan–India Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy in Peshawar (November 1998). The second, in May 2000, was to Islamabad and Karachi, to deliver the first Eqbal Ahmad Memorial Lecture. The latest was as leader of the delegation of retired armed forces personnel. There was one common factor which was evident in each of these visits — namely, an abundance of goodwill and genuine desire for peace at the peoples’ level. During our recent visit in February 2001, I had the opportunity to meet General Musharraf together with Miss Nirmala Deshpande and Lt General Moti Dar (retd.) Each one of us, quite independently and separately, came away with the feeling that here was a thorough professional, and one who was genuinely committed to finding a peaceful solution to our bilateral problems. 

This was certainly quite different from the image painted of him by the media and many analysts, especially after Kargil. 

The Pakistan army, however, continues to enjoy a position of overarching influence in the political affairs of Pakistan — whether in or outside the government. It is also perhaps the only organised force which can contain extreme right-wing elements like the ‘jehadis’ and the ‘Taliban’ as evidenced in certain recent actions by President Musharraf. Likewise, the BJP has demonstrated the ability to contain and to carry the extreme right-wing elements in India. This combination therefore is perhaps the ideal one for crafting a sustainable and broadly acceptable agreement between our two countries. Politically, strategically and realistically speaking, one can therefore place greater hopes in the outcome of this summit as compared to earlier ones.

Hopes, expectations and likely outcomes:
The announcement of the summit has raised the hopes and expectations of people in India and Pakistan and especially in Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the border. These have ranged from ‘finding an immediate solution to all issues —including J&K’ — to one of cynicism about any positive outcome. Clearly one can expect an Agra Declaration to lie somewhere in between these two extremes. Being familiar with the way in which declarations at these levels evolve, it would be reasonable to surmise that a draft of the Declaration would already have been exchanged. Hopefully, the final document would be influenced by the cumulative inputs provided by numerous Track II, Track III and other initiatives of peoples of India, Pakistan, and Jammu and Kashmir. 

Whilst the entire negotiating process at the forthcoming summit would be very challenging, one hopes that statesmanship and vision will provide the requisite energy to set aside traditional mindsets and bureaucratic red–tape, and evolve instead a truly imaginative and yet pragmatic way ahead.

Let me outline in conclusion, what commitments we could expect from an ideal Summit Declaration and which are listed below:

Ø To cease all military operations along the line of control and end all forms of violence in Jammu & Kashmir. 
Ø To keep the bilateral dialogue process alive by activating standing committees — both civil and military — at various levels, who must meet regularly under all circumstances.
Ø To agree to a process for resolving the Kashmir issue with due regard for the wishes of the people.
Ø To agree to mutually balanced force reductions, especially in J&K.
Ø To finalise a nuclear protocol keeping in mind regional security imperatives
Ø To take a joint initiative for global nuclear disarmament.
Ø To relax the existing stringent visa regulations and encourage free movement between our peoples. Likewise, Kashmiris should be permitted to move freely across the Line of Control.
Ø To agree to stop all forms of negative and ‘hate’ propaganda against each other projected in electronic, cyber and print media.
Ø To set up joint action teams to address common problems like disaster management, drug trafficking, smuggling, piracy at sea, and several other subjects. 
Ø To open up sports, educational and cultural, commercial and trade links at all levels.
Ø To immediately free all prisoners held in captivity by both sides.
Ø To reactivate at the earliest the SAARC and SAPTA processes.
Ø To agree to the setting up of a Joint Implementation and Monitoring Team [JIM team] to ensure implementation of all bilateral agreements. (This should include members from SAARC countries).

Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf have indeed an awesome task before them. It calls for statesmanship and vision of a very unique kind to be able to rise above our strongly held views of each other over the past half a century. This alone can give the peoples of this subcontinent a fair chance to realise the promise of peace, justice and real freedom which have been denied them for so long. Should these two be able to achieve even a few constructive steps along the path to establishing a relationship of trust and reconciliation, they would certainly be deserving of a special place in history.