An analysis of Jaideep Patel’s call records is
revealing. It shows that between 8:03 p.m. and 11:58 p.m. on February
27, 2002 he made and received calls to/from Gordhan Zadaphiya. Patel
was also in constant touch with police officers; we do not know why.
His call records show that between 1:05 p.m. and 9:16 p.m. on February
27, 2002 he made and received calls to/from the then DCP (zone V),
Ahmedabad, RJ Savani. CJP submitted details of Patel’s call records to
Malhotra which show that he was also in close touch with chief
minister Narendra Modi’s office. Malhotra is strangely silent on this.
On February 28, 2002 Jaideep Patel had five telephone conversations
with the chief minister’s office (CMO). Why?
The question that remains is whether it is normal
procedure to hand over bodies of the victims of a tragedy in such a
sensitive matter, which could have widespread repercussions on
intercommunity peace and harmony, to an office-bearer of an
organisation like the VHP which has a virulent track record of
instigating violence but which happens to have powerful political
patrons, including the chief minister and senior functionaries of the
ruling party in the state?
Allegation II: The illegal
instructions, to allow Hindus to vent their anger, issued by Modi at a
top-level meeting held at the chief minister’s residence on February
27, 2002. It is clear from the SIT’s investigations that such a
meeting did take place. It has also been established that no minutes
of the proceedings were kept. The continuing dispute is about what
transpired at the meeting.
The SIT recorded a joint statement from Justice PB
Sawant, a former judge of the Supreme Court, and Justice Hosbet
Suresh, a former judge of the Bombay high court, who had been members
of the Concerned Citizens Tribunal – Gujarat 2002. They narrated
details about the February 27 meeting from the confessions made to
them by the late Haren Pandya, former minister of state for revenue,
in mid-May 2002 when he deposed before the tribunal. In their
statement before the SIT, they clearly stated that Pandya had
testified before them that “Narendra Modi had made it clear that there
would be a backlash from Hindus on the next day… and police should not
come in their way”. The FIR also refers to Pandya’s testimony relating
to a high-level meeting convened by the chief minister to which the
then chief secretary, the then home secretary and senior policemen
were summoned and to whom clear instructions were given “not to deal
with the Hindu rioting mobs”.
Sanjiv Bhatt, who is currently making headlines,
had earlier told the SIT that he would speak about this meeting and
the illegal instructions issued at the meeting only if there was a
legal obligation to do so. Bhatt, who in 2002 held the post of SP,
security, in the SIB, also referred to a message received at the
control room on February 27, 2002 announcing that the chief minister
had called for a situational review meeting. As is now well known, the
SIT subsequently recorded a statement from Bhatt under Section 161 of
the CrPC and he has since submitted an affidavit in this regard to the
Supreme Court of India.
The FIR records that RB Sreekumar, who in 2002 held
the post of ADGP, intelligence, had stated in an affidavit before the
Nanavati-Shah Commission that the then director general of police (DGP),
Gujarat, K. Chakravarti, had told him about the crucial meeting held
by Chief Minister Modi on February 27, 2002. The chief minister had
said at the meeting that “in communal riots, police takes action
against Hindus and Muslims on one-to-one basis. This will not do now,
allow Hindus to give vent to their anger” (paragraph 84 of RB
Sreekumar’s fourth affidavit before the Nanavati-Shah Commission dated
October 27, 2005).
Allegation III: The illegal stationing of two
ministers in the state and city police control rooms is a fact that
has been established. The SIT admits this. However, there has been no
attempt to further investigate the logical consequences of political
interference with the proper functioning of the police i.e. preventing
the police in several districts from doing their constitutional duty.
The FIR refers to press reports of the time which documented the
presence of senior cabinet ministers in the state and city police
control rooms and their illegal interference in police functioning,
their subversion of police rules and protocol by instructing policemen
not to function and otherwise manipulating instructions.
Allegation IV: The failure of the police
to act, especially as a direct result of political interference. The
FIR details several instances that corroborate this.
a) K. Chakravarti, the then DGP of Gujarat, had not
given any special instructions about the preservation of law and order
and no strict instructions on how mobs should be dealt with.
b) The then CP, Ahmedabad, PC Pande, commented on
Newshour, Star News, on February 28, 2002 that: “These people
also, they somehow get carried away by the overall general sentiment.
That’s the whole trouble. The police are equally influenced by the
overall general sentiments.”
c) Rahul Sharma, who in 2002 held the post of SP,
Bhavnagar, stated during his cross-examination before the Nanavati-Shah
Commission in 2004 that the attack on a madrassa housing hundreds of
Muslim children, which took place under his jurisdiction on March 1,
2002, appeared to be an organised one. He also revealed that the
minister of state for home, Gordhan Zadaphiya, had later complained to
him about the greater number of Hindu deaths in police firing in
Bhavnagar as compared to Muslims.
d) Police Inspector (PI) Khurshid Mysorewala, who
was stationed at the Naroda police station in 2002, in an affidavit
and during his cross-examination before the Nanavati-Shah Commission
in 2004, averred that due to the lack of preventive measures, the
instructions from superiors about system overload, the non-provision
of reinforcements and other reasons, he was unable to avert the
attacks or respond to the Muslim victims’ cries for help and stop the
heinous crimes that took place in Naroda Patiya.
e) MK Tandon, in 2002, the JCP, Ahmedabad, stated
in his cross-examination before the Nanavati-Shah Commission that when
the incidents at Naroda Patiya and Gulberg Society, Meghaninagar,
occurred, neither he nor the police commissioner were present; that
none of the policemen who were present used force to try and disperse
the mob; and that no inquiries were made by the state home minister
regarding the breakdown of law and order. When the attack on Gulberg
Society took place, two deputy superintendents of police, one PI and
one officer of the Central Industrial Security Force were present but
no strict measures were taken to disperse the mob.
Allegation V: The illegal
instructions given by upper echelons of the Gujarat executive to
senior policemen, recorded by the then ADGP, RB Sreekumar, in a
handwritten personal register and detailed in the FIR.
a) RB Sreekumar, in his third affidavit before the
Nanavati-Shah Commission dated April 9, 2005, records the attempts
made by senior officers in his department and the then undersecretary,
Dinesh Kapadia, the then secretary, law and order, GC Murmu, and the
then government pleader, Arvind Pandya – after Sreekumar had filed his
first affidavit before the commission – to pressurise him to refrain
from filing further affidavits and from telling the truth before the
commission i.e. to make him commit the criminal offence of perjury.
Sreekumar stated that he was intimidated and warned by Murmu and
Pandya to lie on oath and to avoid telling the whole truth.
b) Paragraph 91 of Sreekumar’s fourth affidavit
dated October 27, 2005 lists the names of several senior bureaucrats
and police officials who, despite the expanded terms of reference of
the Nanavati-Shah Commission (which, after July 2004, included within
its ambit the “role and conduct of the then chief minister or any
other ministers in his council of ministers, police officers, other
individuals and organisations” in regard to the post-Godhra violence),
bowed to pressure and did not file second affidavits that would have
enlarged on the conduct of the chief minister Narendra Modi or any
other ministers, etc.
Allegation VI: Officers of the
state have been directly influenced to testify to falsified events and
thereby commit the criminal act of perjury, as the FIR demonstrates.
At the time when the FIR was prepared, this related to the lies and
contradictions stated on oath by senior IPS and IAS officers in their
affidavits before the Nanavati-Shah Commission.
Former Ahmedabad police commissioner PC Pande
(accused No. 28 in the FIR) stated on oath before the Nanavati-Shah
Commission that he had a memory lapse regarding what actually
transpired at Gulberg Society on February 28, 2002. The commission
failed to question him about why curfew was not imposed in Ahmedabad
city until as late as 1 p.m. on February 28 when on February 27, 2002
itself at least 14 incidents of mob violence had been recorded in FIRs
by the police. He was subsequently examined by the SIT on two
occasions when, having apparently regained his memory, he denied being
in possession of control room records and other crucial evidential
material.
The absence of these documents was recorded by the
SIT’s investigating officer, AK Malhotra. Listing the constraints
faced by him as IO, he cites “destruction of critical documentary
evidence” as one of the limitations he faced. Ironically, records were
ostensibly destroyed in 2007 while the Supreme Court was seized of the
matter thus amounting to contempt of court.
Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code, ‘Of False
Evidence and Offences Against Public Justice’ (Sections 201-205), and
Chapter X, ‘Of Contempts of the Lawful Authority of Public Servants’
(Sections 175, 177, 187 and 188), refer to offences by public servants
of failing to assist the course of public justice, destroying evidence
and so on. After the Supreme Court first indicated that it would look
beyond the SIT’s dismissive conclusions (January 20, 2011) and the SIT
began formally recording statements under Section 161 of the CrPC, PC
Pande made an interesting turnabout.
On April 11, 2011 AK Malhotra came to Mumbai to
record the statement of CJP’s Teesta Setalvad under Section 161. She
insisted on mentioning the destruction of records as a specific
culpable, criminal offence whereupon Malhotra unexpectedly informed
her that, post-January 20, while the SIT was recording his statement
under Section 161, PC Pande had done a complete turnaround and
submitted a CD containing 3,500 scanned pages of hitherto ‘destroyed’
documents. Setalvad had in a letter to the SIT dated April 21, 2011
pointed out that Pande’s selective suppression of records during the
SIT’s earlier investigations, and the mysterious reappearance of these
documents, itself merited thorough investigation.
Allegation VII: The top echelons
of the state administration and police force deliberately ignored the
reports and warnings issued by their own State Intelligence Bureau,
and other indicators, as demonstrated in the FIR.
a) RB Sreekumar, in paragraph 17 of his first
affidavit before the Nanavati-Shah Commission dated July 6, 2002,
stated that in response to a message received from the Uttar Pradesh
intelligence department (during the period preceding the Godhra
incident), the Gujarat SIB had requested all SPs and police
commissioners to inform the SP, Faizabad, about the movement of kar
sevaks from their respective jurisdictions. Following this, on
February 16, 2002 the SP, Western Railway, Vadodara, had informed the
IGP, intelligence, Uttar Pradesh, that on February 22, 2002 Prahlad
Patel, president of the Bajrang Dal, Mehsana, would be leading a group
of 150-200 trishul-bearing Bajrang Dal activists to the Ayodhya
Maha Yagna on the Sabarmati Express.
b) In paragraphs 18 and 19 of the affidavit,
Sreekumar points to the failure of the central and Uttar Pradesh
(police) intelligence departments to provide adequate and timely
information to the Gujarat state or SIB about the return journey of
the kar sevaks, their unruly behaviour while returning from
Ayodhya aboard the Sabarmati Express and, more specifically, their
altercation with Muslims when the latter attempted to board the train
at Rudauli.
c) In addition to the reports relating to the
trouble anticipated on and after February 28, 2002, as communal
violence persisted beyond the initial phase, the Gujarat SIB continued
to provide specific intelligence reports, as revealed in paragraph 26
of Sreekumar’s first affidavit. In two such reports dated April 15 and
April 26, 2002, the SIB provided information about impending communal
trouble, including among other things the plan by radical Hindu
elements to launch a large-scale assault on a Muslim colony in
Ahmedabad and a plan by Bajrang Dal leaders to distribute lethal
weapons. None of these reports were acted upon by the police hierarchy
or the state executive.
Ringing evidence
Who was the chief minister calling while
Gujarat burned?
The CMO makes 15 calls to the Ahmedabad
police commissioner, PC Pande, on February 28, 2002. The CP
does not step out of his office between 10:50 a.m. and 7:10
p.m. although the city was aflame from about 11 a.m. onwards.
Were these calls directly correlated to the instructions given
to top echelons of the police not to act?
The CMO makes contact with the VHP Gujarat
general secretary, Dr Jaideep Patel (now an accused in the
Naroda Gaon massacre), five times on February 28, 2002. This
includes three conversations with Sanjay Bhavsar, officer on
special duty to the chief minister, and one with the chief
minister’s PA, Tanmay Mehta.
The chief minister’s office numbers record
only three telephone calls through the day that Ahmedabad was
burning i.e. February 28, 2002. His residence records only two
calls. Is this not unusual?
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Allegation VIII: The punitive
treatment meted out by the state to those police officers who acted
constitutionally to maintain law and order. While the FIR mentions six
officers who were so punished, since then, at least three more
officers have received similar treatment at the hands of the state.
Allegation IX: The rewards given
to the senior IAS and IPS officers who bowed to Chief Minister Modi’s
diabolical, unconstitutional plans. The FIR names 14 officers who were
so rewarded.
Allegation X: The subversion of
the criminal justice system.
The appointment of public prosecutors (PPs) with
allegiances to the groups that led the violence was covered
exhaustively in the May 2009 issue of Communalism Combat. Since
then, CJP has investigated further and filed applications under the
Right to Information Act, especially after a report on NDTV on March
29, 2010 revealed that many of the defence lawyers appearing for the
accused in the nine major carnage trials have been appointed special
public prosecutors to be paid Rs 12-15,000 a day with a specially
amended rule of the Gujarat government’s legal department stating that
fees would even be paid for days of adjournment. Hence the state of
Gujarat is footing the bill for many lawyers appearing for the key
accused in the post-Godhra massacres.
-- Gulberg Society trial: Defence counsel Mitesh
Amin is also a special PP, Gujarat. (Amin was paid Rs 25,52,000 by the
state between April 1, 2009 and March 31, 2010.)
-- Sardarpura trial: Defence counsel HM Dhruv, BC
Barot and JG Rajput (now retired) were appointed special PPs, Gujarat.
(HM Dhruv was paid Rs 17,28,000 by the state between April 1, 2009 and
March 31, 2010.)
-- Naroda Patiya trial: Defence counsel NM Kikani,
BO Sharma, NR Shah, Bharat J. Joshi, MJ Dagli, HC Patel, SR Patel, GS
Solanki, KN Thakor and RN Kikani were appointed special PPs, Gujarat.
-- Naroda Gaon trial: Defence counsel Chetan K.
Shah, Rohit H. Verma, Rajesh N. Modi, MR Khandar, Nilesh Lodha, HC
Patel and PO Sharma were appointed special PPs, Gujarat. (Chetan Shah
was paid Rs 2,97,000 by the state between April 1, 2009 and March 31,
2010.)
-- Odh trial: Defence counsel CK Patel, Bharat J.
Joshi and Ashwin H. Dhagad were appointed special PPs, Gujarat.
In its earliar report submitted to the Supreme Court, the SIT did
find Modi guilty of a brazenly communal mindset. It remains to be seen
what shape the SIT report/charge sheet will now take. n