he House responded
with a resounding ‘Amen’ as a black-turbaned member prayed for the destruction
of America. "Oh God, punish those responsible for the killings of Muslims," he
implored. The newly elected legislative assembly of the North-West Frontier
Province interrupted its opening session to pay homage to Aimal Kansi, the
Pakistani national who had been executed a week earlier in America for killing
two CIA officials. For the Islamists he was a martyr. Thousands of people
attended his funeral in his home town, Quetta.
Pakistani parliamentary elections in October 2002 had swept
radical Islamists into power in the key border province. The success of the MMA
(Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal), the six-party conservative Islamic coalition,
came on the wave of strong anti-American sentiments following US military action
in neighbouring Afghanistan. ‘It is a war between Islam and the American
infidel.’ This slogan instantly hit a chord with Pashtuns who believed their
ethnic brethren on the other side of the border were being victimised by US
forces and the US-supported administration in Kabul.
The Islamists also capitalised on anti-Musharraf feelings
stemming from his pro-US policies. They charged him with ‘betraying Afghan
Muslims and siding with the infidels’. The Islamists openly expressed solidarity
with bin Laden and Mullah Omar. The campaign also helped the MMA to win votes in
the western Balochistan province where it shared power with a pro-military
coalition. The resurgence of radical Islamists portended ill for a nation in the
midst of a war against Islamic militancy, threatening its political, cultural
and social stability.
The installation of a conservative Islamic government in the two
border provinces, which had turned into sanctuaries for the Taliban and al-Qaeda
remnants fleeing from Afghanistan, caused great concern to the United States.
The MMA was closely linked with the Taliban and its rise to power fuelled
insurgency in Afghanistan. There was a marked increase in attacks on US forces
and their Afghan allies by the Taliban who then fled back to the Pakistani
Pashtun tribal areas. US military officials had repeatedly threatened hot
pursuit of the Taliban into Pakistan. Pakistan’s Pashtun populated areas in the
NWFP and Balochistan are contiguous with the Pashto-speaking region of southern
Afghanistan. That proximity has historically shaped the region and resulted in
cross-border kin and group ties. This cross-border ethnic bond had played a
significant role in Pakistan’s involvement, first in running covert operations
against the Soviet forces and later helping the predominant Pashtun Taliban
movement.
The entire top leadership of the MMA was Pashtun and hence had
strong cross-border associations. The MMA’s electoral success also carried
long-term political implications at home as the battle for the very soul of
Pakistan intensified. It was the first time in Pakistan’s political history that
the mainstream Islamic parties, representing different Islamic sects, had come
together. The MMA had grown out of an alliance of religious and jihadist groups
that took shape following the events of September 11 and the subsequent US
military campaign in Afghanistan.
Initially, some three dozen Islamic groups were united under the
banner of the Defence of Afghanistan Council to show solidarity with the Taliban
regime and Osama bin Laden. It was later renamed the Defence of Afghanistan and
Pakistan Council to oppose the US military action in Afghanistan. The council
could not do much more than organise anti-US and anti-Musharraf demonstrations.
The routing of the Taliban regime came as a serious blow to the Pakistani
Islamic movement. Demoralisation set in when a US-supported government was
installed in Kabul, forcing bin Laden and his men to flee for their lives. As
the elections approached, six of Pakistan’s most powerful parties, including
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP),
regrouped themselves in the form of the MMA.
Their shared perception of the post-9/11 world and their anti-US
position impelled them to unite on one platform. One common objective was to
resist Musharraf’s policy turnaround. Musharraf was bound by the Supreme Court
ruling to hold parliamentary elections and transfer power to an elected
government by October 2002. He however made his intentions very clear: there was
going to be no complete transfer to an elected Parliament or to a civilian
government. On the eve of the elections he made sweeping changes in the
Constitution, ensuring that he would continue to hold sway in the new order.
The controversial redrafting of the Constitution exposed
Musharraf’s plan to establish a ‘controlled democracy’ in which the military
would continue to cast its heavy shadow. It removed all illusions about the
country’s return to democracy. The changes gave the president extensive powers,
including the right to dismiss an elected Parliament. A
military-dominated National Security Council, with overriding powers over
Parliament, was to monitor the future civilian government. It was an entirely
new Constitution in which the source of power was outside the Parliament.
Musharraf described the new order as the transition from
‘democratic dictatorship to an elected essence of democracy’. And it was not
enough that the military government tried to micromanage the outcome of the
elections and manipulate a ‘favourable result’. For several weeks before the
nomination papers were filed, Tariq Aziz, the president’s powerful principal
secretary, had camped out in Lahore, wheeling and dealing with politicians. The
country’s most influential bureaucrat had an important task assigned to him by
his military leader. His job was to knock together a pro-military alliance.
Aided by Major-General Ehtesham Zamir, the head of the ISI’s internal wing,
Tariq Aziz manoeuvred a list of ‘loyal’ candidates.
Most of them belonged to the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid)
faction but there were several others who the military government believed were
willing to cooperate. They included some of Pakistan’s most corrupt politicians,
raising questions about Musharraf’s pledge to fight corruption. State machinery
was blatantly used to get a ‘favourable result’. Tariq Aziz, a close pal of
Musharraf’s from his student days, has been his key political strategist and had
earlier engineered a split in the Pakistan Muslim League. However, it was not
just Tariq Aziz’s dexterity but also heavy arm-twisting by the ISI as well as
the administration which forced many to switch their loyalties. Never before had
the spy agency, despite its notoriety, been used in such rampant political
manipulation. Many opposition candidates were often summoned by ISI operatives
and urged to join the pro-military alliance. Others had even worse experiences.
After successfully disqualifying Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif,
the former prime ministers, Musharraf had removed his two main rivals from the
election field. With the leaders of the largest parties in exile, Pakistan for
the first time witnessed an election campaign through remote control. Musharraf
thought he had the elections all sewn up. The ISI had assured him that the race
would produce what he wanted: a friendly Parliament full of ‘new faces’. And he
had no reason to doubt his spooks. The MMA would be a counterbalance to the
liberal opposition parties, he was told. The mullahs had won only two seats in
the previous elections so they would not be a threat this time either, only a
menace to the opposition.
But that assessment went awry despite the micromanagement of the
elections. The MMA took full advantage of the fragmentation of the liberal
parties generated by the military establishment. Despite their conflict over
Musharraf’s turnaround on Pakistan’s Afghan policy, the traditional link between
the military and the Islamists had not been fully severed. Both considered the
liberal Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) to be
their main adversaries. The two sides mended fences on the eve of the polls
after a three-hour meeting between Musharraf and Qazi Hussain Ahmad, chief of
Jamaat-e-Islami, the most vocal critic among the Islamists.
He reminded Musharraf that his party had always stood by the
military despite their differences over the regime’s support of the USA. There
was also a marked softening in the government’s rhetoric against religious
extremism. Islamic activists rounded up during the anti-American protests were
freed. While many anti-military politicians were barred on corruption charges or
disqualified by the clause that required a candidate to have a university
degree, the Islamic candidates were given a free hand. Mullahs with madrassa
education were allowed to run. The military government even allowed Azam Tariq,
the leader of the outlawed sectarian-based party, the SSP (Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan), to stand for a National Assembly seat. Azam Tariq, who was alleged to
have been involved in scores of murder cases, was freed on bail. The Musharraf
government, which had vowed to eliminate extremism, had apparently given its
blessing to a known terrorist. The politics of expediency cost both Musharraf
and the country dearly.
Musharraf misjudged the rising support for the Islamists. A
couple of weeks before the polls he had assured senior American officials that
the religious parties would not get more than five per cent of the vote. MMA
leaders had started campaigning long before the other parties entered the field.
They fully exploited the anti-American feelings among the Pashtuns who were
incensed by the US attack on Afghanistan. The absence of Benazir Bhutto and
Nawaz Sharif, the crowd-pullers for the Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan
Muslim League, also helped the MMA. It was a virtual revolution through
the ballot box when the Islamic alliance swept the polls in the NWFP, deposing
the traditional power elite. The landslide victory took even the MMA
leaders by surprise. The Islamists also consolidated their position in
Balochistan. Success was however restricted to these two provinces.
In Punjab and Sindh, the alliance’s influence was marginal. In
these, the most populous provinces, the voters did not respond to the anti-US
rhetoric and Islamic fervour. Because of the heavy concentration of the vote in
one ethnic belt it translated into a higher number of seats for the alliance in
the National Assembly where it emerged as the third largest block. The election
result was however not an indicator of the rising influence of Islamic
fundamentalism.
There were several anomalies that helped to amplify the actual
strength and popular base of the religious parties. While the MMA was third in
the popular vote (11.6 per cent of votes cast), it won 63 National
Assembly seats, including 10 reserved for women, out of 342. The MMA
might not have been directly involved in the militancy but its components like
the JI and the two factions of the JUI had long been associated with jihadist
politics. Their activists overlapped with those of militant and sectarian
organisations. Former Taliban and jihadist commanders were among MMA candidates
for the National and provincial assemblies. The banned jihadist organisations
openly campaigned for the alliance. They saw the success of the MMA as a
triumph for their cause.
There was a visible stridency among the radical elements after
the MMA formed the government in the NWFP and became a coalition partner in
Balochistan. Although their success was confined to the Pashtun ethnic belt, the
Islamists, for the first time in Pakistan’s history, took the political centre
stage. They emerged as a major power player, holding the balance in the divided
National Assembly. Despite the military’s best efforts, the election results
reflected a no confidence vote against Musharraf’s military government. More
than 60 per cent of the votes went to the parties opposed to the military
regime. For all its pre-poll manipulation, the military failed to contain the
liberal forces. The Pakistan Peoples Party received 25.8 per cent of the
total votes cast, with the pro-military Pakistan Muslim League (Q) trailing
behind with 25.7 per cent. The Pakistan Muslim League (N) bagged
9.4 per cent, less than the MMA’s share of 11.6 per cent.
The situation would have been worse for the general had the
elections been conducted in a free and fair manner. European Union observers
called the elections ‘flawed’. In a scathing criticism of the election process,
their report said that the secrecy of the vote was compromised and the count
showed serious shortcomings. They reported that the Election Commission of
Pakistan had failed to curb the abuse of state resources, particularly, in
favour of pro-military political parties. The polls had created a horizontal
polarisation, with all four provinces going in different directions. While the
NWFP went to the MMA, Punjab sided with the pro-military PML(Q). In Sindh, the
PPP maintained its stronghold in the rural areas while the Muttahida Qaumi
Movement (MQM), an ethnic-based party representing Urdu-speaking migrants, swept
the urban areas. The MMA broadened its support base in Balochistan.
Musharraf faced a very tricky situation with his loyalists
failing to get a majority in the National Assembly, which was required to form
the federal government. He tried to strike a deal with the MMA but the
negotiations apparently collapsed after the MMA demanded the post of prime
minister and stuck to its crucial demand that Musharraf give a firm date to step
down as chief of army staff. The Islamists also called for the reversal of
Pakistan’s support for the USA and the withdrawal of American troops from the
country. These conditions were obviously unacceptable to Musharraf. It was
difficult for the MMA leaders as well to give up their crucial demands because
of pressure from the hardliners in their ranks. The MMA was believed to have had
the backing of some of the generals, who had been sidelined because of their
opposition to Musharraf’s pro-American policy. The right-wing generals, who had
close links with the Islamists, looked for an opportune moment to embarrass the
president.
Despite its divergence on important policy issues like support
for the US war on terror in Afghanistan and the crackdown on jihadist
organisations, the Islamists had not completely severed their ties with the
military. The MMA leaders had targeted Musharraf personally but their loyalty to
the military had remained unchanged. That was one reason for the military’s
continuing conciliatory approach towards the Islamists, whom it regarded as its
logical ally. The MMA was more than willing to play by the military’s rules. The
mullahs and the military had worked together against common foes during the cold
war and the Afghan jihad and had shared the military’s national security
perspective and its views on regional issues. The MMA leadership had also been
engaged in secret negotiations with ISI officials involved in political fixing.
However, because of political considerations, they stopped short of entering
into an alliance with the federal government despite the alliance in Balochistan.
The military however pulled out the required number of votes by
manipulating a split in the PPP. It was made possible after Musharraf, in a
highly controversial move, suspended the ban on floor-crossing which allowed
opposition members to switch sides. Most of these turncoats had faced corruption
charges and could easily be blackmailed. Almost all of them were given important
positions in the cabinet. Faisal Saleh Hayat, a prominent PPP leader, had been
charged for defaulting on the repayment of loans from state-owned banks and had
spent months in prison, making him extremely vulnerable politically. He was made
interior minister after the defection. A senior general walked up to him
during the oath-taking ceremony to congratulate him for what he described as a
‘courageous move in the national interest’! With all the manipulation and
horse-trading engineered by intelligence agencies, Zafarullah Jamali, the
pro-military candidate for prime minister, barely scraped through. His
controversial one-vote majority came as a relief to Musharraf who wanted a
pliable prime minister in place.
A tribal leader from Pakistan’s western Balochistan
province, Jamali had a reputation of being an establishment person who was
unlikely to take a stand against a powerful military president. An easy-going
stoutly built soft-spoken politician, he had served as chief minister for three
brief terms in his native province, most recently in 1996. He had also been a
federal minister in the military regime of late General Zia ul-Haq in the
mid-1980s. His friends called him ‘Jabal’ (mountain) – a nickname as a young man
for not crying after a bad injury during a hockey match. Musharraf was also
sworn in for another five-year term as president the same day that the new
Parliament met. He had extended his term through a controversial referendum in
April.
The newly elected prime minister was just a figurehead as the
president continued to call the shots on most matters, particularly on foreign
and economic issues. His government meanwhile faced a tough challenge from a
formidable and vocal opposition in Parliament, especially from the religious
Right who refused to accept the changes in the Constitution made by the
president, giving himself sweeping powers. The installation of an elected
Parliament and a civilian administration changed the country’s political
dynamics. Musharraf came under immense pressure to quit his job as army chief.
The conflict between Parliament and the military president over the changes in
the Constitution had remained unresolved, raising serious questions about the
sustainability of the new set-up.
The American attack on Iraq in 2003 gave a new impetus to the
Islamists to whip up anti-American and anti-Musharraf sentiments and broaden
their support base. "We can topple the government any time," boasted a senior
MMA leader after a huge anti-war rally in Peshawar. Bold and daring words
inspired by what was perhaps the biggest of the marches organised by the Islamic
alliance across the country to protest against the American aggression in Iraq.
In a sight rarely seen in Pakistan, thousands of protesters thronged to the
rally, venting their anger against Bush as well as General Musharraf. ‘Down with
Bush’ and ‘Down with Musharraf’ were the most common slogans. The unprecedented
public response to the MMA’s protest call had visibly boosted their confidence
and brought a new stridency to their supporters.
The Islamists successfully manipulated the popular revulsion
against the American attack and increased their credentials as the country’s
major political force. They were not yet in a position to force the ousting of
Musharraf but they had certainly forced the government into a tight corner and
dictated their own political agenda. Musharraf tiptoed on a tightrope. While
trying to maintain its cooperation with the USA in the war on terror, his
administration scrambled to desperately identify itself with the feeling on the
streets and prevent public anger from boiling over into an anti-government
uprising. Massive anti-war protests and across-the-board anti-American sentiment
forced the government to carry out a delicate balancing act by distancing itself
from the US operation while at the same time not alienating the USA or
allowing the Islamist alliance to stoke anti-American fires to an explosive
point.
Pakistan’s stance of not supporting the US attack on Iraq helped
the government to some extent in defusing public anger but Musharraf’s long-term
political problems continued to simmer on the back burner. Islamabad’s support
for Washington was balanced against two powerful forces at home: the religious
conservative forces that had gained tremendous political support and the
military that did not seem to be happy with the war in Iraq. Riding on
the wave of popular anti-war sentiments and emboldened by their new-found public
support, Islamic groups intensified their attack on Musharraf, calling him an
‘American stooge’. MMA leaders tried to use anti-American sentiment to vent
their anger against the government’s pro-West policies and to gain maximum
political mileage from a potentially volatile situation. The Islamists grabbed
the opportunity to expand their support base in Punjab and Sindh.
There was a visible rise in the activities of the outlawed
Islamist extremist groups, which were back in the field exploiting
anti-Americanism. The militant leaders, recently freed from house arrest,
returned to the mosques to rally the Muslims against the United States and
recruit volunteers for a new ‘holy war’. Hundreds of Pakistani volunteers
enrolled themselves to fight in Iraq after an Islamic cleric issued a fatwa that
it was obligatory for all Muslims to join ‘the jihad’ against the invasion of a
Muslim country by American forces. Rising anti-American sentiments coupled with
a surge in support for conservative Islamist groups had a significant fallout in
neighbouring Afghanistan where the US-led coalition forces were locked in battle
with the remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
There was an alarming rise in the number of attacks by
insurgents in southern Afghanistan. The increasing number of rocket attacks
targeting coalition bases was a testimony to the support for the Afghan
resistance from the pro-Taliban administration in the NWFP and Balochistan. For
the first time since their ousting, some key former Taliban leaders resurfaced
and openly operated from inside Pakistan. Musharraf managed the balancing act
quite well. Tightly wedged between the mullahs and a hard place, he emerged
unscathed from the crisis. After narrowly escaping a series of assassination
attempts Musharraf got some much needed respite when in December 2003 he won a
protracted constitutional battle legitimising his rule. A vote of
confidence by Parliament allowed him to stay on as president for the next four
years. It was the second boost for the military ruler in a week. On the last day
of the year lawmakers approved a series of amendments in the Constitution making
him an all-powerful leader vested with the authority to dismiss an elected
government as well as Parliament.
Musharraf owed his triumph solely to the hard-line religious
groups that had hitherto been at odds with him over his pro-US policies as well
as his domestic crackdown on Islamic militants. In return for their support for
his presidency Musharraf had agreed to shed his military uniform by the end of
the year. "There comes a time in the lives of nations when important decisions
must be taken," he said. "That time has come." The president hoped the move
would end the political deadlock which had paralysed Parliament since the
elections 14 months earlier.
The deal between Musharraf and the MMA had revived the
traditional alliance between the mullahs and the military. It also strengthened
the Islamists’ hold over the bordering provinces where the Taliban had
regrouped. This ‘marriage of convenience’ however had not deterred the more
extremist elements from plotting to kill him. Ironically, the suicide attack on
the president’s convoy came just a day after the signing of the deal between the
MMA and the government. He was a marked man and they were after his life.
Musharraf did not realise that he could not ride on both boats. The Islamists
tried to make the best of their new-found political clout. Besides pushing for
the adoption of Islamic Shariah laws, the administration pledged to end
co-education and close down movie theatres, which it considered to be a western
violation of traditional norms and values.
The administration ordered schools to replace shirt and trouser
uniforms with the traditional shalwar kameez, describing the
wearing of western dress as ‘un-Islamic’. In order to Islamise the education
system, more Islamic texts were used in school and college curricula. The MMA’s
agenda to end co-education was the first step towards the total segregation of
women in public life. These retrogressive measures were part of an attempt to
impose a Taliban-like orthodox Islamic system. The MMA government increased the
role of religion in political and social life. The chief minister, Akram Khan
Durrani, had to grow a beard after some Islamic leaders said he lacked this
criterion of a ‘good Muslim’; under the strict Shariah law Muslim men were
expected to wear beards. The MMA demanded abolition of the 25 per cent of
seats reserved for women in the National and provincial assemblies, saying they
had no business to be in Parliament.
These measures fuelled intolerance and gave a free hand to the
mullahs, who opposed female education. In Peshawar, thousands of Islamic zealots
smashed billboards carrying pictures of female models, declaring them
un-Islamic. Non-governmental organisations working in the field of female
education were particularly targeted by the mullahs, who often accused them of
spreading ‘obscenity’. "We feel very vulnerable," said Maryam Bibi, a tribal
woman who had provoked the wrath of the Islamic zealots by opening schools for
girls in remote villages. Her organisation, Khwendo Kor (Sisters’ Home), ran
more than 40 schools in the most conservative parts of the province. One of its
offices was bombed after Bibi refused to close down the schools.
In July 2005 the NWFP provincial assembly passed a controversial
Hisba (Accountability) law which envisaged setting up a watchdog body to
ensure people respected calls to prayer, did not engage in commerce at the time
of Friday prayers and that unrelated men and women did not appear in public
places together. The law also prohibited singing and dancing. Reminiscent of the
infamous Department of Vice and Virtue, the law proposed the appointment of a
mohtasib (one who holds others accountable) to monitor the conduct of the
populace so that it was in accordance with Islamic tenets.
The actions taken by the mohtasib, chosen from among the
top clerics, could not be challenged in any court of law. He had the powers of
the judges of the high court to punish anyone obstructing his authority. He was
also to monitor the media to ensure that they were ‘useful for the promotion of
Islamic values’. Spying and anonymous denunciation were encouraged. Any citizen
could complain to the mohtasib against any other person for not observing
‘Islamic values’. It was clearly a step towards Talibanisation and the
establishment of religious fascism. The enactment of the law was stopped after a
ruling by the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared that it violated the
Constitution. But the Islamic government appeared determined to enforce it with
some changes. The mullahs were encouraged by Musharraf’s policy of accommodation
of the religious Right and his backtracking on his pledge to regulate madrassas,
most of which were run by MMA component parties. His move to marginalise liberal
political forces gave the Islamists tremendous space to carry out their agenda.
A weak civilian set-up was unable to fight Musharraf’s battle, in
Parliament as well as in public. Most of the ruling party members were
ideologically much closer to the MMA and considered it their natural
ally. They were reluctant to fight for Musharraf’s reform agenda and his
so-called ‘enlightened moderation’.
It was not a great surprise when President Musharraf, on
December 30, 2004, formally declared that he was not doffing his military
uniform, breaking a public pledge that he had made exactly a year earlier. "My
stepping down from the post of army chief at this critical juncture would be
dangerous for the country," he asserted in a televised address to the nation.
Musharraf defended his decision, saying that he was a marked man and that the
situation had changed since he made his promise. He claimed that the
‘renaissance’ he led would be in serious jeopardy if he retired from the army.
The renaissance however, in terms of tackling extremism, did not amount to much.
The military’s reluctance to make a clean break with its traditional allies
among radical Islamist groups, coupled with the suppression of liberal political
parties, left the country hostage to extremist elements. Blinded by the demands
of regime survival, the military continued to patronise the religious Right to
counter its secular and democratic opposition.
Half-hearted measures, largely taken under international
pressure, totally lacked conviction. Musharraf’s so-called vision of
‘enlightened moderation’ might have brought a marked improvement in the
country’s cultural atmosphere and won him applause from the West but that was
where it ended. On most key issues he had backtracked under pressure from his
own right-wing allies and the mullahs. The much touted education reforms had
long been stalled after top ruling party leaders and the MMA strongly opposed
changes in the school curriculum which inculcated retrogressive ideology.
In December 2004 Parliament passed a bill mandating a
stiffer penalty in all cases where men killed female relatives on suspicion of
having illicit relations. But the legislation was so diluted as to be
ineffectual. The new rules did not outlaw the practice of the killer being able
to buy his freedom by paying compensation to the victim’s relatives. They also
allowed the victim’s family to pardon the perpetrators. Since the killer was
often a close family member himself he would invariably get amnesty. Human
rights groups contended that because of loopholes in the laws crime against
women had risen.
In 2005 the government acquiesced to the demand of
Islamic radicals to include people’s religious affiliations in their passports.
The new passport not only identified the religion of every Pakistani but also
his or her sect. Religious minorities feared the passport would widen the
sectarian divides that had plagued the country. Senior government officials
rejected the argument that Musharraf coddled extremists, maintaining that the
pace of reform was determined by the capacity of society. They argued that
because of the odds facing him Musharraf had adopted an incremental and gradual
approach towards implementation of his reform agenda. "He does not want to act
hastily and in the process evoke an extremist backlash," argued a military
spokesman. "Breaking away from deeply held customs will take some time. We
believe in bringing change not through revolutionary but evolutionary means."
Musharraf also had to contend with the armed forces who were
deeply steeped in General Zia’s culture. Because of his government’s failure to
deliver, to any substantial degree, on pledges to contain the growth of jihadist
networks religious extremism in Pakistan continued to pose a threat to domestic,
regional and international security. Many Pakistani madrassas continued
providing recruits to extremist groups. In July 2005, following the terrorist
attacks in London, Musharraf had admitted his government’s failure in
implementing madrassa reforms. He argued that he was not politically strong
enough to push through measures to curb militant madrassas. He vowed to clamp
down on them but there has not been much progress made. The leaders of extremist
religious organisations continued to enjoy virtual immunity from the laws and
carried on preaching their jihadist sectarian ideology, using mosques and
madrassas to recruit new cadres for their cause.
Giving in to pressure from the religious Right, the Musharraf
government also backtracked on its pledge to reform discriminatory Islamic laws
that were open to abuse by religious fanatics. Existing legislation against the
incitement of sectarian hatred and violence was rarely enforced. The jihadist
media continued to flourish; audio and videotapes, books and pamphlets that
propagated the most virulent sectarian views were easily available. The
government even failed to disarm the jihadist private armies which Musharraf had
publicly denounced. The horizontal and vertical fragmentation of society along
political, religious and ethnic lines, which has intensified over the past few
years, posed the most serious problem for both Musharraf’s and Pakistan’s
survival.